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ERE are some facts about money and politics in today’s America.
At the federal level, campaign spending totaled $7.3 billion in
2012.“ Almost all of this funding came from individual donors, not cor
porations or unions.**3 Individuals gave about half of their contributions to
specific candidates, a quarter to political parties, and a quarter to Politi
cal Action Committees (“PACs”) and Super PACs.4 These donors were
in no way representative of the country as a whole. They were heavily
old, white, male, and, of course, wealthy.5 They also were far more po
larized in their political views than the general population.6 Most Ameri
cans were moderates in 2012, but most donors were staunch liberals or
conservatives.7
However, there is no evidence that much of this money is traded ex
plicitly for political favors. Proof of quid pro quo transactions is vanish-

H

See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the
2011- 2012 Election Cycle (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130419_
2012- 24m-Summary.shtml [hereinafter FEC 2012 Summary] (2012 spending by entities dis
closing donors totaled $7.0 billion); 2012 Outside Spending, by Group, Ctr. for Responsive
Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=0&type=
U&chrt=D (last visited June 23, 2015) (2012 spending by entities not disclosing donors totaled
$308.7 million).
3 See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J.
Econ. Persp. 105, 109 (2003) (“It is evident that individuals, rather than organizations, are by
far the most important source of campaign funds.”); Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence:
On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and Executives 1, 8 (June
20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2313232) (disclos
ing that corporate spending totaled only $75 million and disclosed union spending only $105
million in 2012).
4 See FEC 2012 Summary, supra note 2. Conventional PACs may contribute to candidates
but are subject to contribution limits in their fundraising. Super PACs may not contribute to
candidates but may raise money in unlimited quantities. See also SpeechNow.org v. FEC,
599 F.3d 686, 694-98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (authorizing creation of Super PACs).
' See Peter L. Francia et al., The Financiers of Congressional Elections: Investors, Ideo
logues, and Intimates 16 (2003) (“[Contributors are indeed overwhelmingly wealthy, highly
educated, male, and white. The pool of congressional contributors does not remotely look
like America . . . . ”); Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequali
ty?, 27 J. Econ. Persp. 103, 111 (2013) (noting “that the share of campaign contributions
made by the top 0.01 percent of the voting age population is now over 40 percent”).
See Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A
Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 519, 536
(2010) (showing bimodal distribution of donors compared to more normal distribution of
non-donors); Michael Barber, Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters
in the U.S. Senate 19-20 (Apr. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://csed.
byu.edu/Documents/BarberPaper2.pdf) (showing wide gulf between ideal points of donors
and voters).
7 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536; Barber, supra note 6, at 19-20.
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ingly rare ,8 and studies that try to document a link between PACs’ con
tributions and politicians’ votes typically come up empty .9 But there is
evidence that politicians’ positions reflect the preferences of their donors
to an uncanny extent. 10 The ideal points of members of Congress—that
is, the “unique set[s] of policies that they ‘prefer’ to all others”—have
almost exactly the same bimodal distribution as the ideal points of indi
vidual contributors. *11 They look nothing like the far more centrist distri
bution of the public at large. 12
Suppose a jurisdiction is troubled by this situation and decides to en
act some kind of campaign finance reform. What reason might it give?
One option is preventing the corruption of elected officials. But the Su
preme Court has recently narrowed the definition of corruption to quid
pro quo exchanges, 13 and, as just noted, such exchanges do not occur
with any regularity in contemporary America. 14 Another possibility is
avoiding the distortion of electoral outcomes due to the heavy spending
of affluent individuals (and groups). But the Court has emphatically re
jected any governmental interest in ameliorating “the corrosive and dis
torting effects of immense aggregations of wealth.” 15 Yet another idea is
equalizing the resources of candidates or the electoral influence of vot8 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003) (noting that, when assembling record
for Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Congress was unable to find “concrete evi
dence of an instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote” in re
sponse to a contribution).
9 See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 3, at 116 (concluding in meta-study of relevant
literature that “changes in donations to an individual legislator do not translate into changes
in that legislator’s roll call voting behavior”). But see Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Mon
ey in Politics: A (Partial) Review of the Literature, 124 Pub. Choice 135, 146 (2005) (reach
ing opposite conclusion).
’° See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536-37 (showing that members of Congress and
donors both have highly bimodal ideal point distributions); Barber, supra note 6, at 19-20
(showing that typical donor is much closer ideologically to her senator than is typical voter);
Bonica, supra note 3, at 17-18, 32 (also showing highly bimodal distributions for members
of Congress and donors).
11 Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences
in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. Pol. 330, 331 (2013); see also, e.g., Bafumi
& Herron, supra note 6, at 521 (“Ideal points . . . are best thought of as reflecting preferred
policy choices in a given policy space.”).
12 See supra note 10.
13 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“Congress
may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”); Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909-10 (2010).
14 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
15 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 883 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 660 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ers. But this equality interest has been deemed invalid in even more stri
dent terms. “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”16
So is our reformist jurisdiction out of luck? Not quite. This Article’s
thesis is that there is an additional interest, of the gravest importance,
that both is threatened by money in politics and is furthered by (certain)
campaign finance regulation.17 This interest is the promotion of align
ment between voters’ policy preferences and their government’s policy
outputs. Alignment operates at the levels of both the individual constitu
ency and the jurisdiction as a whole. Within the constituency, the views
of the district’s median voter and the district’s representative should
align. One step up, the preferences of the jurisdiction’s median voter and
the legislature’s median member should correspond. Moreover, at the
jurisdictional level, the median voter’s views should be congruent not
only with the median legislator’s positions, but also with actual policy
outcomes. Preference alignment refers to the former sort of congruence;
outcome alignment to the latter.
Alignment is a significant—indeed, compelling—interest because of
its tight connection to core democratic values. At the district level, it fol
lows closely from the delegate theory of representation. A delegate
“must do what his principal would do, must act as if the principal him
self were acting . . . must vote as a majority of his constituents would,”
as Hanna Pitkin wrote in her landmark work.18 In other words, a delegate
must align his own positions with those of his constituents. Likewise, at
the jurisdictional level, alignment is essentially another term for majoritarianism. To say that policy should be congruent with the preferences of
the median voter is to say that it should be congruent with the prefer
ences of the voting majority. Of course, majoritarianism is not our only
democratic principle. But, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, it is “required
as a matter of fairness to all those who participate in the social choice.”19
16 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
In earlier work, I have applied the alignment approach to election law as a whole. See
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 283, 286-87
(2014); see also infra Section I.A (explaining motivation for campaign finance focus of this
Article).
18 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 144-45 (1967).
19Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 Yale L.J.
1692, 1718 (2014) (emphasis omitted) (referring to decision-making procedures in legisla
tures and courts).
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Unsurprisingly, given its democratic roots, the concept of alignment
has surfaced repeatedly in the Court’s campaign finance decisions. In a
2000 case, the Court recognized “the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors”—and not compliant
enough with the wishes of voters.20 In a 2003 case, the Court warned of
“the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the
desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who
have made large financial contributions.”21 And in its most recent cam
paign finance decision, McCutcheon v. FEC,2~ a decision otherwise un
remittingly hostile to regulation, the Court strikingly concluded its opin
ion with a paean to alignment. “Representatives are not to follow
constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive
to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of
self-governance through elected officials.”23
Despite these doctrinal hints, some scholars claim that alignment is a
forbidden interest in the campaign finance context. Kathleen Sullivan
reasons that alignment reflects a particular theory of democracy, and that
speech cannot be restricted based on “one vision of good government.”24
Similarly, Robert Post contends that in the First Amendment domain of
public discourse, public opinion is forever changing shape. Thus “[t]here
i s . . . no ‘baseline’ from which [misalignment] can be assessed.”0
These critiques are misplaced. As to Sullivan, it might be controversial
for the Court to embrace a specific model of democracy, but surely a
popularly elected legislature may do so. In fact, legislatures adopt theo
ries of self-governance all the time, both when they regulate money in
politics and when they enact other electoral policies. As to Post, public
opinion actually is not as fluid as he suggests, and alignment furthers
what he deems the crucial aim of public discourse: making “persons be
lieve that government is potentially responsive to their views.”20 It is un
clear as well why electoral speech should be considered part of public

20 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
21 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).
22 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion).
23 Id. at 1462 (plurality opinion).
24 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
663, 680 (1997).
25 Robert C. Post, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution 53
(2014).
26 Id. at 49.
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discourse rather than the managerial domain of elections, in which
speech may be regulated to serve the domain’s ends.
Even if alignment is not a forbidden interest, it may be a duplicative
one. As Richard Hasen has argued, it may be nothing more than a slick
repackaging of the anti-distortion or equality interests that the Court al
ready has rejected.27 This charge also misses its mark. The distortion that
cannot justify campaign finance regulation, in the Court’s view, is the
skewing of electoral outcomes due to large expenditures,28 The Court
has never suggested that the warping of policy outcomes due to large
contributions (or their equivalent) is an illegitimate basis for regulation.
The distortion of voters is different from that of representatives.
Alignment also is distinct from equality (in all its guises). One form
of equality is the leveling of candidate resources. But candidates need
not be equally funded to produce alignment, nor does alignment follow
from evenly sized war chests. Another kind of equality is equal repre
sentation for all voters. But it is only the median voter, not every voter,
who is entitled to congruence under the alignment approach. Alignment
at the median can arise only if there is misalignment at all other points in
the distribution. A final type of equality is equal voter influence over the
political process. But equal influence is, at most, a means to achieving
alignment. It is not the end itself. Alignment also is possible under con
ditions of unequal influence, and equal influence does not necessarily
result in alignment.
Assume, then, that alignment is a compelling interest that neither is
barred by First Amendment theory nor is identical to goals the Court al
ready has rebuffed. We are not done yet. The next step is to determine
whether money in politics can generate misalignment, and whether cam
paign finance reform can promote alignment. According to a burgeoning
political science literature, the answer to both questions is yes, at least
sometimes. The relevant empirical evidence fits into three categories.
First, according to numerous studies, wealthy Americans have more
influence on politicians’ voting records and actual policy outcomes than
do poor or middle-class Americans.29 This extra sway is evident whether
House or Senate voting records, or state or federal policy outcomes, are
‘7 See Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a Political Equality
Argument for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 Election L.J. 305,
308 (2013).
i8 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
29 See infra Section III.A.
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considered. It also appears even after non-monetary forms of political
participation (voting, volunteering, contacting officials, etc.) are con
trolled for. Second, as noted at the outset, politicians and donors have
nearly identical ideal point distributions: highly bimodal curves in which
they cluster at the ideological extremes and almost no one occupies the
moderate center.30 Voters’ views, in contrast, exhibit a normal distribu
tion whose single peak is in the middle of the political spectrum. It is
fair to say that donors receive exquisitely attentive representation—and
that voters receive virtually no representation at all.
Third, campaign finance regulation can be aligning or misaligning
based on its implications for how candidates raise their money.31 Tight
individual contribution limits reduce the funds available from polarized
individual donors. They therefore encourage candidates to shift toward
the ideological center, the home of the median voter. Conversely, strin
gent party or PAC contribution limits have the opposite effect. Both par
ties and PACs are relatively moderate in their giving patterns—parties
because their chief goal is winning as many seats as possible, PACs be
cause they want access to incumbents of all political stripes. Reducing
the funds available from these more centrist sources thus incentivizes
candidates to move toward the ideological fringes. As for public financ
ing, its impact hinges on its treatment of individual donors. “Clean mon
ey” schemes that provide block grants to candidates after they receive
enough individual contributions are misaligning because of the extrem
ism of the donors who initially must be wooed. But multiple-match sys
tems that offer high matching ratios for small contributions may be
aligning because of the more representative pool of donors they attract.
What do these findings mean for the constitutionality of different pol
icies? Individual contribution limits would sit on sturdy legal ground
under the alignment approach. Whatever their link may be to the preven
tion of corruption, they demonstrably further the governmental interest
in alignment. Unlike under current law, individual expenditure limits al
so might survive judicial scrutiny. Since politicians mirror the views of
not only individuals who donate directly to them, but also individuals
who spend on their behalf, no great significance would attach to the contribution/expenditure distinction. Public financing that relies on individ
ual donors who resemble the general population (or that does not rely on

30 See infra Section III.B.
31 See infra Section III.C.
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individual donors at all) would be valid as well. On the other hand, con
tribution and expenditure limits for parties and PACs could not be sus
tained by reference to alignment. Since these entities are relatively mod
erate, their funds exert little misaligning pressure. Public financing that
requires appeals to polarized individual donors also could be justified
only on the basis of other interests.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the alignment inter
est. It describes the different forms of alignment, explains the role the
concept has played in earlier campaign finance cases, and responds to
the claim that general First Amendment principles proscribe the interest.
Part II argues for the distinctiveness of alignment. It compares alignment
to the interests the Court already has considered—anti-corruption, anti
distortion, and equality—and shows that it is different from each of
them. Part III conveys the current state of knowledge about alignment. It
summarizes the many studies on the misaligning influence of money in
politics, as well as the fewer studies on the aligning impact of (some)
regulation. Lastly, Part IV assesses the implications of this literature for
the validity of different policies. Individual contribution and expenditure
limits, and certain kinds of public financing, should be upheld because
they promote alignment. But contribution and expenditure limits for par
ties and PACs, and other kinds of public financing, cannot be justified
on this basis.
One final question should be answered before proceeding further.
Given the array of interests already asserted in the campaign finance
context, is there really a need for another one? In fact, the need is dire,
for two reasons. First, the only interest the Court currently considers to
be legitimate—the narrowly construed anti-corruption interest—neither
captures the full extent of the harm caused by money in politics, nor is
sufficient to sustain most campaign finance regulation. In recent years,
policies have toppled like dominos, rejected by the Court due to a lack
of fit with this interest. If the reform project is to avoid collapsing entire
ly, we must, in Michael Kang’s words, “look[] beyond the prevention of
corruption as defined by the Court.”32

32 Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1, 47 (2012); see
also Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 27 Ga. St. U.
L. Rev. 887, 890 (2011) (“The central constitutional question in campaign finance law is
what public interests justify restrictions . . . affecting the use of campaign money.”); GuyUriel E. Charles, Corruption Temptation, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 25, 26 (2014) (“We no longer
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Second, the misalignment produced by electoral fundraising and
spending is not holding steady. Instead, it is getting worse. Over the last
generation, the share of campaign funds provided by the wealthiest
0.01% of Americans has surged from about 10% to more than 40%.33
During the same period, individual donors steadily have become more
extreme in their political views,34 and candidates steadily have become
more dependent on their contributions.^ As a result, the representational
gap in favor of the affluent is now five times larger than it was in the
1970s and 1980s.36 Misalignment thus is not a problem that can safely
be ignored. Rather, it is a problem that—increasingly—threatens to
swallow American democracy.
I. T h e A l ig n m e n t I n t e r e s t

The term alignment is unhelpful until it is clear what should be
aligned and where. I begin this Part, then, by identifying two axes that
can be used to categorize different forms of alignment. The first refers to
the governmental output that should be aligned with voters’ preferences;
the second to the governmental level where the alignment should occur.
After defining the alignment interest, I address a series of related issues:
its democratic appeal, its administrability, its novelty, and its legal and
practical limitations.
Upon conclusion of this brisk survey, I turn to the place of alignment
in the campaign finance doctrine. The Supreme Court often has used
talk about the gamut of values that we would like to see reflected in a system of campaign
financing.”).
33 See Bonica et a t, supra note 5, at 112.
34 See Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse, Don’t Blame Donors for Ideological Polar
ization of Political Parties: Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors,
1972-2008, 40 Am. Pol. Res. 501,510 (2011) (showing rise in proportion of donors who are
“ideologues” from 40% in 1972 to 60% in 2008).
35 See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of State
Legislatures 22 (Oct. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://politicalscience.
byu.edu/Faculty/Thursday%20Group%20Papers/Limits.pdf) (showing rise in share of state leg
islative candidate funds received from individual donors from 25% in 1990 to 50% in 2012);
Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in Negotiating
Agreement in Politics: Report of the Task Force on Negotiating Agreement in Politics 31
(Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013) (showing analogous rise in individual con
tributions to congressional candidates from 50% to 75%).
36 See Christopher Ellis, Representational Inequity Across Time and Space: Exploring
Changes in the Political Representation of the Poor in the U.S. House 9 (unpublished manu
script, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (showing gap between alignment
of House members with rich and with poor constituents over time).
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language evoking alignment to denote a legitimate basis for regulation,
including in its most recent decision on the subject. But, ironically, the
substance of the Court’s holdings often has contributed to the misalign
ment that plagues modem American politics. And again the Court’s
most recent case is no exception.
Lastly, I respond to the critique, made in the 1990s by Sullivan and in
the 2013 Tanner Lectures by Post, that alignment (or something like it)
is a forbidden interest in the campaign finance context. Sullivan wrongly
claims that it is impermissible for a jurisdiction to embrace a particular
theory of democracy, and wrongly supposes that such a choice can be
avoided. And Post should be more receptive to actual alignment given
his endorsement of perceived alignment as a basis for regulation. The
gap between reality and perception is insufficient to bar one interest but
to compel the other.
A. Reprise
I mentioned above that my survey of the alignment interest would be
brisk. This is because I have elaborated on the interest elsewhere, in
work arguing for the adoption of alignment as an overarching principle
of election law.37 There is no reason to repeat all of that analysis here.
But there is reason to say more about alignment in the campaign finance
context specifically. As noted earlier, the anti-corruption interest urgent
ly needs to be bolstered, and the misalignment caused by money in poli
tics is steadily worsening.38 The bulk of the Article thus examines the in
tersection of alignment and campaign finance. Only this Section deals
with alignment more generally.
Starting with taxonomy, there are three kinds of governmental outputs
that should be congruent with voters’ preferences.39 The first is a repre
sentative’s partisan affiliation. If a representative belongs to the party
preferred by the median voter,40 then there is partisan alignment. The
'See generally Stephanopoulos, supra note 17 (introducing and urging adoption of align
ment approach).
38 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. This also is the only domain where the
very validity of the alignment interest is disputed.
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 304-10. Careful readers may note that my termi
nology is slightly different here than in my earlier work. What I previously called “policy
alignment” I now refer to as “preference alignment.” I also discuss outcome alignment in
this Article while I omitted it before. See id. at 311-12.
40 The median voter is the voter at the midpoint of the relevant distribution. Only this voter
necessarily represents the views of a majority of the electorate, and so cannot be outvoted by
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second is a representative’s policy views. If a representative has the
same ideal point as the median voter, then there is preference alignment.
And the third is actual policy outcomes. If enacted policy corresponds to
the wishes of the median voter, then there is outcome alignment. Of
these three variants, I address only the latter two in this Article (and de
pict only them in Figure 1). Asymmetric campaign spending can cause
partisan misalignment, by shifting electoral outcomes from what they
would have been under conditions of more equal outlays.41 But this is
the one form of misalignment that the Court’s precedent unambiguously
rules out as an acceptable basis for regulation.42
Next, there are two governmental levels at which alignment should
occur.43 The first is the individual constituency, in which the preferences
of the district’s median voter and the district’s representative should be
congruent. Since districts have (almost) no policymaking authority, only
partisan alignment and preference alignment are sensible concepts at this
level. The second is the jurisdiction as a whole, in which governmental
outputs should match the preferences of the jurisdiction’s median voter.
With respect to partisan alignment and preference alignment, the rele
vant outputs are, in turn, the partisan affiliation and the ideal point of the
median legislator. With respect to outcome alignment, the relevant out
put is enacted policy. As discussed below, both dyadic and collective
alignment should be deemed valid rationales for regulation.44
any other group. For this majoritarian reason, the median voter serves here as the normative
benchmark relative to which alignment is determined.
41 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 338-39. In this case, misalignment ensues be
tween the median actual voter and the median hypothetical voter exposed to more equal out
lays. See id.
42 In case after case, the Court has rejected interests that are based on a benchmark of
equal campaign spending. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825 (2011) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the govern
ment has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing field’ that can justify undue bur
dens on political speech.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) (rejecting
interest in preventing distortion of electoral outcomes due to heavy corporate spending); Da
vis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741-42 (2008) (rejecting interest in “leveling] electoral opportu
nities for candidates of different personal wealth”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976)
(rejecting “interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates competing for
elective office”). I do not agree with these cases’ reasoning, but I bracket this disagreement
for present purposes.
4~ See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 310-11. Again, my terminology for these levels is
slightly different here than in previous work. What I previously called “district-specific
alignment” I now refer to as “dyadic alignment,” and what I previously labeled “legislative
alignment” I now dub “collective alignment.”
44 See infra Sections I.B-I.C, Part II.
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Figure 1: Illustrations of Preference and Outcome Misalignment
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Why, then, is alignment an attractive value? The most important an
swer is that it is implied by several widely accepted theories of democ
racy. At the dyadic level, one of the classic conceptions of the repre
sentative’s role is the delegate model. As the earlier quote from Hanna
Pitkin illustrates, a delegate is supposed to act in accordance with the
wishes of his constituents—to “do what his principal would do.”45 In the
words of two other theorists, “The delegate theory of representa
tion . . . posits that the representative ought to reflect purposively the
preferences of his constituents.”46 Both of these formulations come close
to requiring alignment. If a delegate does what his constituents want, he
should be aligning his positions with theirs.
Likewise, at the collective level, one (though hardly the only) pillar of
American democratic thought is majoritarianism. Madison stated in The
Federalist Papers that the “fundamental principle of free government” is
that the “majority . . . would rule.”47 Hamilton declared it a “poison” to
“subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.”48 In more
recent times too, Alexander Bickel has remarked that we are “a nation

43 Pitkin, supra note 18, at 144.
46 Donald J. McCrone & James H. Kuklinski, The Delegate Theory of Representation, 23
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 278, 278 (1979).
47 The Federalist No. 58 (James Madison).
48 The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). My aim here is not to make an originalist
case for alignment, but rather to observe that positions consistent with it are well within the
mainstream of the American democratic tradition. See also Bruce E. Cain, Democracy More
or Less: America’s Political Reform Quandary 147 (2015) (observing that populism is one
of three major schools of American democratic thought, and that populism understands
“democratic distortion” to be “a chronic deviation from median voter preference”).
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committed to . . . majoritarian democracy, ” 49 and Jesse Choper has writ
ten that throughout “this nation’s constitutional development from its
origin to the present time, majority rule has been considered the key
stone of a democratic political system .” 50 Once again, alignment follows
from these arguments. If the wishes of the collective majority (embodied
in the median voter) are heeded by officeholders, then governmental
outputs should be congruent with those wishes.51
To be sure, there are other theories of democracy with which align
ment is in tension .52 The trustee model of representation holds that elect
ed officials should exercise their own independent judgment, not abide
by the preferences of their constituents.5' Pluralists argue that “minori
ties rule” as they join together in ever shifting combinations.54 Minimal
ist democrats downplay congruence in favor of retrospective accounta
bility based on politicians’ records in office.55 And so forth. But the
point here is not that alignment is required by democratic theory. It is
only that alignment is consistent with key conceptions of democracy—
and thus that jurisdictions should have the discretion to invoke it if they
so desire. Alignment may not be an obligatory state interest, but surely
its democratic origin makes it a permissible one .56
The other advantage of alignment is that it is more determinate than
concepts such as corruption, distortion, and equality. As I explain in Part
II, the Court has struggled for nearly forty years to construe these terms,

49 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 188(1962).
50 Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Re
consideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 4 (1980).
51 Of course, majoritarianism is inapplicable to “areas that the Constitution has declared
off-limits to ordinary politics,” such as the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Stephanopoulos,
supra note 17, at 321. It also is important to distinguish between majoritarianism in the elec
tion of representatives and majoritarianism in the adoption of positions and policies by rep
resentatives. Only the latter form of majoritarianism is equivalent to alignment.
52 Though as I have explained in my previous work, this tension is more illusory than real,
in particular for pluralism and minimalism. See id. at 313-16.
3 See Pitkin, supra note 18, at 127.
54 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 132 (1956).
55 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 272 (2d ed. 1947).
56 A fascinating issue, which I note here but do not explore further, is what makes a given
interest “compelling” for purposes of constitutional law. Is it enough that an interest corre
sponds to a theory of democracy? But, if so, why is equality not a compelling interest? And
how does an interest rooted in a democratic theory rate relative to interests based on other
values, such as national security or the righting of historical wrongs? These are important
and difficult questions, and I hope to address them in future work.
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lurching unpredictably from one definition to another.57 In contrast,
alignment quite plainly refers to the correspondence of a given popular
input with a given governmental output. Per the above taxonomy, it is
true that there are different inputs and outputs that can be aligned at dif
ferent levels. But this only means that there are several kinds of align
ment. It does not undermine the clarity of the idea itself. If “[a]n ounce
of administrability is worth a pound of theoretical perfection,” as David
Strauss has quipped about justifications for campaign finance reform,
then alignment may tip the scale.58
A skeptic might retort that alignment is theoretically determinate but
practically hopeless. How, after all, are voters’ policy preferences and
their government’s policy outputs even supposed to be measured, let
alone compared to each other? Not long ago, this objection might have
been fatal. But in the last few years, political scientists have made great
strides in quantifying both public opinion and the activities of elected of
ficials.59 The most promising “new work takes advantage of questions
answered by both voters and representatives to plot their positions in a
common policy space.”60 To the extent that they pertain to money in pol
itics, these studies are discussed in Part III.61 In sum, this scholarship
leaves little doubt that, as a group of political scientists has written,
“methodological advances [now] allow us to evaluate the congruence
between voters and legislators across districts and time.”62
But while the indeterminacy charge falls flat, there are other critiques
(or, rather, caveats) that ought to be acknowledged. First, the alignment
57 See infra Part II.
58 David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 1369,1386(1994).
59 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 308 n.102 (discussing these advances).
60 See id. at 308-09 & n. 103 (examining these studies in particular).
61 See infra Part III.
6‘ Thad Kousser et al., Reform and Representation: A New Method Applied to Recent
Electoral Changes 2 (June 3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=2260083); see also, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 524 (noting
ability to “bridg[e] institutions and voters in a way that allows common space ideal point es
timates to be generated”); Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legisla
tures, and Individuals in a Common Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro
and Micro Levels 3 (Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association) (succeeding in “measuring ideological distributions of state congres
sional delegations, legislatures, and citizens all on the same scale”). Moreover, both voters’
and officeholders’ ideologies typically can be captured by a single left-right dimension cor
responding to governmental intervention in the economy (at least in recent years). See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 309 & nn.104-05.
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interest does not always support the lawfulness of campaign finance
regulation. Policies that exert an aligning influence may be defended on
this basis. But policies whose effects are ambiguous or misaligning—of
which there are many—must be tethered to other interests or else face
invalidation. Alignment does not give a free pass to challenged laws.
Second, while no other scholar has argued explicitly for alignment as a
compelling interest, the idea that money in politics may disrupt the link
between public opinion and public policy is not new. It has appeared in
the work of, among others, Richard Briffault, Bruce Cain, Samuel Issacharoff, and Lawrence Lessig.63 What is new here is the framing of the
issue as well as the systematic treatment of the theory, doctrine, and em
pirics of alignment.
Third, alignment is not, of course, the only available interest in the
campaign finance context. The prevention of (a constricted notion of)
corruption remains a valid basis for regulation, and the Court also rec
ognizes an informational interest in providing voters with data about
campaign contributions and expenditures.64 Moreover, the anti-distortion
and equality rationales may have been “orphaned,” in Hasen’s phrase,
but their resonance cannot be denied in a democracy that adheres to the
principle of one person, one vote .65 Fourth, it is important to be clear that
money in politics is only one of many causes of misalignment in today’s
America. Even if the misaligning effects of campaign funds were elimi
nated entirely, significant non-congruence would persist thanks to fran
chise restrictions, partisan pressures, legislative rules, gerrymandered

63 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan
to Stop It 151 (2011) (proposing concept of “substantive distortion,” the “gap between what
‘the People’ believe about an issue and what Congress does about that issue”); Richard
Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1751,
1772 (1999) (identifying “danger that officeholders will be too attentive to the interests of
donors . . . and insufficiently concerned about the public interest”); Bruce E. Cain, Moralism
and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. I l l , 138; Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118, 126 (2010).
64 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010).
65 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 989, 990 (2011). There also are several important election law values oth
er than alignment, such as competition, participation, and minority representation. See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 356-58, 360.
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districts, etc. Misalignment is a complex phenomenon with no simple
solution.66
And fifth, perfect alignment is an inherently unattainable goal. Even a
jurisdiction (or representative) that cares about nothing else might lack
information about voters’ preferences on certain subjects, or be unable
to change policies (or policy stances) at exactly the same rate at which
public opinion shifts. Voters’ preferences on particular matters also
might be weak, uninformed, or unstable—and so less worthy of respect
from a democratic perspective (and more difficult to heed from a practi
cal one). Overall ideological alignment, then, is more vital than align
ment on each individual issue that appears on the political agenda.
Likewise, persistent misalignment is more objectionable than misalign
ment that is temporary and soon resolves.67
Lastly, it is worth noting two ways in which the alignment approach
advocated here is more modest than the one I have recommended else
where. first, I only claim that alignment is a legitimate interest that may
shield aligning laws from invalidation. I do not claim that alignment is a
constitutional imperative that may be wielded as a sword to strike down
misaligning laws.66 And second, the only benchmark I use for assessing
alignment is the median actual voter. 1 do not consider more exotic
benchmarks such as the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even
campaign spending.69 The normative appeal of the median actual voter is
hard to deny in a democracy in which the electorate chooses the repre
sentatives who then enact policy. There also is little relevant difference
between the median actual voter and other attractive figures such as the
median eligible voter or the median citizen. All of these figures’ policy
preferences are quite centrist—in marked contrast to the views of those
who represent them.70

66 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 324-36, 342—55, 360-65 (discussing misaligning
effects of other election laws); id. at 360-65 (discussing misaligning effects of non-legal fac
tors).
67 See id. at 309-10 (also making this point).
See id. at 327, 333-34, 346, 353 (discussing situations where alignment could be used as
sword).
l'9 See id. at 338; see also id. at 325 (using benchmark of median eligible voter who would
have gone to polls in absence of franchise restriction).
1If anything, actual voters are more extreme (and, on net, conservative) than eligible non
voters or non-eligible non-voters. See, e.g., Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Who Votes
Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States 159 (2013); John
D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented?, 67 J. Pol. 1206, 1214 (2005).
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B. Doctrinal Role
The above was admittedly a bit of a breakneck tour of the alignment
interest. But it sufficed, I hope, to lay the groundwork for the ensuing
application of the interest to campaign finance law.71 I begin this appli
cation by considering the role that alignment has played in the Court’s
cases on money in politics. It by no means has been their centerpiece,
but it has appeared in them repeatedly— less surprisingly in the more
pro-regulatory period of the early 2000s, but more unexpectedly in the
Court’s most recent blockbuster, McCutcheon v. FECC However, de
spite the lip service they sometimes have paid to alignment, the Court’s
decisions also have helped produce the startling misalignment that de
fines American politics today. By nullifying all expenditure limits and,
just this year, pennitting much larger aggregate contributions, the Court
often has strengthened misaligning forces at the expense of aligning
ones.
Most analyses of campaign finance doctrine begin with the 1976 deci
sion of Buckley v. Valeo™ but the Court’s first references to alignment
date back (at least) to 1957. In United States v. Automobile Workers™
involving the prosecution of a labor union for funding a campaign com
mercial, the Court defended the federal ban on corporate and union elec
toral activity as follows: “The idea is to prevent. . . the great aggrega
tions of wealth from using their corporate funds . . . to send members of
the legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests as against those of the public.”7'' The
Court added that “when an individual or association of individuals
makes large contributions . . . they . . . occasionally, at least, receive,
consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which not infre
quently is harmful to the general public interest.”76

The levels of misalignment reported in Part III thus would increase if a different benchmark
were used.
71 Readers who would like a more extensive treatment should consult my earlier work. See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 304-65 (detailing alignment approach to election law).
77 134 S. Ct. at 1461-62.
73 See, e.g., id. at 1444 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
74 352 U.S. 567(1957).
75 Id. at 571 (quoting Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (Robert
Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76 Id. at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507 (1924) (statement of Sen. Robinson)); see also id.
(“[0]ne of the great political evils of the time is the apparent hold on political parties which
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Both of these passages articulate an interest akin to alignment. In the
first excerpt, the stated purpose of the federal ban is preventing elected
officials from pursuing the “protection and the advancement of [corpo
rate] interests” and so neglecting “those of the public.”77 This is another
way of saying that the ban aims to avoid misalignment in the direction
of corporate concerns. Similarly, the second quote asserts that large con
tributions sometimes can induce “consideration by the beneficiaries”
that is “harmful to the general public interest.”78 In other words, large
contributions sometimes can induce misalignment in the direction of
contributors.
In the post-Buckley era, the first hint of the alignment interest came in
the 1985 case of FEC v. NCPAC.19 The majority struck down a limit on
PAC spending in presidential races.80 But in dissent, Justice White
voiced his concern about the potential “infusion of massive PAC ex
penditures into the political process.”81 His fear was that, thanks to these
expenditures, “[t]he candidate may be forced to please the spenders ra
ther than the voters, and the two groups are not identical.”82 That is, the
candidate may be forced to align her positions with the spenders who
support her campaign rather than the voters who actually elect her.
Justice White’s argument in dissent became the holding of the Court
in two important cases in the early 2000s. First, in Nixon v. Shrink Mis
souri Government PAC, the Court described the problem that contribu
tion limits are meant to solve as the “broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”83 Politicians too com
pliant with the wishes of contributors, of course, are not compliant
enough with those of voters. The Court also noted that outsized checks
can foster the “cynical assumption that large donors call the tune.”84 This

business interests . . . seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign contribu
tions.” (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507 (1924) (statement of Sen. Robinson))).
7g Id. at 571 (quoting Root, supra note 75) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507 (1924) (statement of Sen. Robinson)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To be fair, the “public interest” is not necessarily identical to the
views held by the median voter. These excerpts thus convey a slightly different conception
of misalignment.
79 470 U.S. 480(1985).
80 See id. at 501.
81 Id. at 517.
82 Id.
83 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
Id. at 390; see also id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that contribution limits
“seek to protect the integrity of the electoral process—the means through which a free socie-

2015]

Aligning Campaign Finance Law

1443

is a claim about the appearance rather than the reality of misalignment,
but it sounds in a similar register.
Second, in McConnell v. FEC , 85 the Court used language even more
evocative of alignment to uphold the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s
(“BCRA”) soft money ban.86 The Court observed that soft money donors
received special access to officeholders, which led in turn to undue in
fluence over their decisions. “Im plicit. . . in the sale of access is the
suggestion that money buys influence.”87 The Court also catalogued a
number of cases in which soft money donors managed to thwart the pas
sage of popular bills. “The evidence connects soft money to manipula
tions of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ failure to enact,
among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco
legislation.”88 And in its clearest ever statement of the alignment inter
est, the Court declared, “Just as troubling to a functioning democra
cy . . . is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on . . . the
desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who
have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”89
This “danger” is the essence of misalignment.
In the decade after McConnell, no Court majority referred to align
ment, but the concept continued to surface in individual Justices’ opin
ions. In the 2007 case of FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., Justice
Scalia lamented that “the effect of BCRA has been to concentrate more
political power in the hands of the country’s wealthiest individuals.”90
He noted that in 2004, “a mere 24 individuals contributed an astounding
total of $142 million to [unregulated groups].”91 In the 2010 case of Citi
zens United v. FEC, Justice Stevens argued that when “private inter-

ty democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action”); FEC v. Co
lo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (citing language from
Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 388-89 on “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment”).
85 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
86 “Soft money” refers to previously unregulated funds that were donated to political par
ties to pay for activities other than express advocacy for or against candidates. See id. at
122-24.
87 Id. at 154 (“[Purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to pur
chase just such influence.”).
88 Id. at 150.
89 Id. at 153.
90 551 U.S. 449, 503 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
91 Id. at 503-04; see also id. at 522 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the “pervasive dis
tortion of electoral institutions by concentrated wealth” through “the special access and
guaranteed favor that sap the representative integrity of American government”).
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ests . . . exert outsized control over officeholders solely on account of
the money spent on (or withheld from) their campaigns, the result
can . . . [be] a ‘subversion . . . of the electoral process.’”92 And in the
2011 case of Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, Justice Kagan remarked that the “ultimate object” of the First
Amendment is “a government responsive to the will of the people.”93
She added that “[i]f an officeholder owes his election to wealthy con
tributors, he may act for their benefit alone, rather than on behalf of all
the people.”94
Lest these comments be dismissed as the sour grapes of dissenting
Justices, the full Court, in its most recent campaign finance case,
McCutcheon v. FEC , 95 concluded its opinion with what can be read as a
tribute to alignment. “For the past 40 years, our campaign finance juris
prudence has focused on the need to .. . [avoid] compromising the polit
ical responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process,” began the
Court’s coda.96 Turning to political theory, the Court continued: “As
Edmund Burke explained. . . a representative owes constitu
ents .. . judgment informed by ‘the strictest union, the closest corre
spondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constitu
ents.’”97 And summing up its views, the Court announced,
“Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but can be ex
pected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such re
sponsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through
elected officials.”98

130 S. Ct. 876, 962-63 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 575).
3 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2846 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 2830.
95 134 S. Ct. at 1434.
,6Id. at 1461 (plurality opinion).
97 Id. at 1461-62 (quoting Edmund Burke, The Speeches of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke
129-30 (J. Burke ed., Dublin, James Duffy 1867)).
Id. at 1462; see also id. at 1441 (arguing that “a central feature of democracy” is that
constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who
are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns”). Justice Breyer’s dissent
also contained several passages noting the importance of alignment. See, e.g., id. at 1467
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing “the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931))); id. at 1468 (ex
plaining “the constitutional effort to create a democracy responsive to the people—a gov
ernment where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments”).
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Given the context, it is unclear what kind of responsiveness the Court
had in mind when it penned this passage. In McCutcheon, the Court
voided aggregate contribution limits that imposed a ceiling on the total
amount of money that donors could give in federal elections.*1’1’ The
Court thus may have been lauding politicians’ responsiveness to con
tributors here, not their responsiveness to voters. ' 00 But even if this is
what the Court meant, it certainly is not what it said. Indeed, the Court
referred three times to “constituents” as the group to which elected offi
cials should be responsive. 101 Accordingly, McCutcheon remains the
Court’s most recent, most extensive—and most unexpected—account of
the importance of alignment.
To be sure, neither McCutcheon nor any other case actually has held
that alignment is a distinct governmental interest that can justify the reg
ulation of campaign funds. The paean in McCutcheon was pure dictum
in a decision otherwise hostile to regulation . 102 Likewise, the excerpts
from Shrink Missouri and McConnell were efforts to broaden the
Court’s definition of corruption, not to devise a new rationale for regula
tion . 103 The Court also has shied away from these excerpts in subsequent
cases. 104 The point, then, is not that the Court has been employing some
thing like the alignment approach all along. It plainly has not been. Ra
ther, the point is that the Court sometimes has appreciated the value of
alignment, and sometimes has recognized that money in politics can ex
ert a misaligning influence. Were a future Court to designate alignment
as a discrete state interest, it thus would be building on—not disrupt
ing—its own precedent. (And this is very much a project for a future
Court; the odds of the current majority embracing a new state interest in
this area are next to nil.)
A second caveat about the Court’s case law is that however positively
it might have portrayed alignment, its actual impact often has been high99 See id. at 1442-^13 (plurality opinion) (describing operation of aggregate limits).
100 Some support for this view comes from Justice Kennedy’s opinion in McConnell. He
also declared that “[democracy is premised on responsiveness,” and elaborated that “a sub
stantial and legitimate reason . . . to make a contribution to[] one candidate over another is
that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.”
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
01 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1461-62.
102 See, e.g., id. at 1441 (listing types of campaign finance laws barred by Court’s prece
dent).
103 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153; Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 389.
104 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
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ly misaligning. As discussed in Part III, the key mechanism through
which money in politics causes misalignment is the donating and spend
ing of highly unrepresentative individuals.105 Either candidates shift their
positions in these individuals’ direction in order to attract more funding,
or only candidates who share the individuals’ positions in the first place
become financially viable. Either way, non-congruence ensues in favor
of this class of donors and spenders—and against ordinary voters.
The Court s decisions have bolstered this dynamic by removing many
of the constraints that jurisdictions have tried to place on individual con
tributions and expenditures. In Buckley itself, the Court struck down lim
its imposed by Congress on individual expenditures.106 In Citizens Unit
ed, the Court vetoed limits on corporate expenditures as well.107 Its
conclusion that independent expenditures are inherently non
corrupting108 also enabled the creation of Super PACs: entities that can
accept unlimited contributions (mostly from wealthy individuals) be
cause they devote all of their resources to expenditures rather than can
didate donations.109 And in McCutcheon, the Court dismantled the ag
gregate contribution limits that had prevented rich donors from writing
checks to dozens or hundreds of a party’s candidates.110 Now a single
donor may give as much as $3.6 million in a single cycle.**111
In combination, these decisions have increased sharply the resources
that affluent individuals can bring to bear on the electoral process. Had
all three cases come out the other way, for instance, individuals would
be able to donate no more than $5,200 per federal candidate,112 no more
than $123,200 in aggregate,113 and not at all to Super PACs (which
would not exist).114 Individuals also would be able to spend no more

105 See infra Part III.
106 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51.
107 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896-913.
See id. at 910 (“[independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of,
quid pro quo corruption.”).
See supra note 4; see also Kang, supra note 32, at 34 (discussing formation of Super
PACs in immediate aftermath of Citizens United).
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444-62 (plurality opinion).
111 See id. at 1473-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" 2 See >d- at 1442 (plurality opinion) (noting current base contribution limit). All figures
cited here are per two-year election cycle.
‘ See id. at 1443 (noting aggregate contribution limit struck down in case).
See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing role of Citizens United in giving
rise to Super PACs).
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than $2,000 advocating for the election or defeat of a given candidate.11'’
In contrast, under current law, a single billionaire, Sheldon Adelson,
managed to deploy $150 million in the 2012 cycle, mostly in contribu
tions to Super PACs and other even less regulated groups.116 Another
150 or so individuals provided at least $1 million each.117 It is the Court,
then, that deserves a good deal of the blame for the misalignment that
pervades American politics. The Court’s rulings have freed wealthy in
dividuals from most of their regulatory restraints, thus intensifying their
misaligning effect on the political system. Regrettably, this actual effect
far outweighs the Court’s occasional warm words about the merits of
alignment.
C. A Forbidden Interest?
And as for these warm words, two prominent scholars warn that they
should not be taken too seriously. In fact, according to both Sullivan and
Post, alignment (or something closely related to it) is a forbidden interest
in the campaign finance context, barred by general First Amendment
principles. Sullivan’s critique is based on her observation that a jurisdic
tion that asserts the alignment interest thereby commits itself to a partic
ular conception of democracy. Post’s challenge follows from his view
that public opinion is inherently fluid, and thus incapable of being
aligned or misaligned with any governmental output. I respond to both
of their claims below.
Beginning with Sullivan, she acknowledges that concern about misa
lignment is a common rationale for campaign finance regulation. “Of
ficeholders who are disproportionately beholden to a minority of power
ful contributors, advocates of finance limits say, will shirk their
responsibilities to their other constituents . . . .”118 She also recognizes
that alignment is linked to a specific democratic theory: “a populist view
in which the representative ought be as close as possible to a transparent

115 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-40 (per curiam) (noting individual expenditure limit struck
down in case).
116 See Peter H. Stone, Sheldon Adelson Spent Far More on Campaign than Previously
Known, Huffington Post (Dec. 3, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/
2012/12/03/sheldon-adelson-2012-election_n_2223589.html.
117 See Bonica et al., supra note 5, at 112-13.
118 Sullivan, supra note 24, at 679.
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vehicle for plebiscitary democracy.”119 But this link is precisely the
problem, in her view. “[Selecting one vision of good government is not
generally an acceptable justification for limiting speech___ [Align
ment] claims the superiority of a particular conception of democracy as
a ground for limiting speech.”120 In other words, the democratic origin of
the alignment interest is not the core of its appeal but rather its fatal
flaw.
Sullivan is correct that the primary reason for a jurisdiction to invoke
alignment is that it is drawn to the theory of democracy that alignment
represents. But she is wrong to suppose that there is anything illegiti
mate about a jurisdiction embracing a particular democratic theory. In
fact, jurisdictions do so all the time, and they then cite these theories as
justifications for burdening a host of individual rights, not just speech.
Take, for example, the myriad requirements that states apply to candi
dates (especially from minor parties) seeking to be listed on ballots.
These requirements typically are defended on the grounds that they “fa
vor the traditional two-party system” and “temper the destabilizing ef
fects o f . . . excessive factionalism”—and they typically are upheld.121
Or consider the countless districts that deviate at least somewhat from
the rule of one person, one vote. When these districts are contested, ju 
risdictions argue that the deviations are justified by their interests in
compactness, congruence with political subdivisions, and the like.122
And they usually prevail as well.123
119 Id. at 681. This is not quite how I would describe the democratic theories with which
alignment is most consistent. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (explaining how
alignment follows from delegate model of representation and from majoritarianism).
1“° Id. at 680-81 (emphasis omitted). Similar arguments can be found in some of the
Court’s recent cases. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion) (“Cam
paign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives [than preventing corruption], we have
explained, impermissibly inject the Government ‘into the debate over who should govern.’”
(quoting Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2826)).
121 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) (upholding ban on
fusion candidacies); see also, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992) (upholding
ban on write-in candidacies based on state’s interest in avoiding “unrestrained factional
ism”); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) (upholding deadline on party en
rollment based on state’s interest in “preservation of the integrity of the electoral process”).
122 See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161-62 (1993) (upholding malapportioned districts resulting from “policy in favor of preserving county boundaries”); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764-75 & n.8 (1973) (same); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323
(1973) (same where state “sought to avoid the fragmentation of such subdivisions”).
123 See Action on Redistricting Plans, 2001-07, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (Jan. 9,
2008, 9:08 PM), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/
action2000.htm (showing that majority of redistricting lawsuits failed in 2000s cycle); see
also Briffault, supra note 63, at 1767-68 (“[W]hat is striking about the jurisprudence of elec-
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Even in the campaign finance context, it is not only the alignment in
terest that entails a commitment to a particular vision of democracy. The
anti-corruption and informational interests, which Sullivan omits from
her analysis, do so too. In a recent article, Deborah Heilman explains
that corruption is a “derivative concept” that is meaningful only if one
first adopts a theory of how an uncorrupted individual or institution
would act. 124 When the relevant individual is an officeholder and the rel
evant institution is a legislature, “[w]hat constitutes political corrup
tion . . . depends on a theory of democracy.” 125 What constitutes corrup
tion, that is, depends on precisely the issue that Sullivan deems offlimits. 126 Likewise, the rationale for notifying voters about the sources of
campaign messages is, in the Court’s words, to “enable[] the electorate
to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speak
ers .. . ,” 127 This aim also rests on a contested view of how democracy
should operate—as evidenced by the fact that at least one Justice disa
grees with the Court’s position . 128
Sullivan might respond that the anti-corruption and informational in
terests are invalid as well. 129 Perhaps money in politics should be dereg
ulated entirely so as to prevent jurisdictions from picking among demo

tions is the Court’s willingness to let legislatures determine some of the substantive values
that election rules may advance . .. .”).
124 Deborah Heilman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 Mich.
L. Rev. 1385,1389(2013).
125 Id. at 1394; see also Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Fi
nance Law, 14 Const. Comment. 127, 128 (1997) (“Any adequate standard of corruption . . .
must be grounded in a convincing theory of representation.”).
126 Because Heilman is wary of having the Court select a theory of democracy, she argues
for judicial deference to the elected branches’ conception of corruption. See Heilman, supra
note 124, at 1410-11. This, of course, is almost the exact opposite of Sullivan’s position.
Sullivan believes that the elected branches should not choose a theory of democracy at all.
Heilman believes that only the elected branches should make this choice.
127 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
128 See id. at 979-82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
disclosure requirements are unconstitutional because they abridge right to anonymous
speech). Moreover, as soon as the Court recognizes an interest asserted by a jurisdiction, it
too necessarily adopts a specific theory of democracy. See Heilman, supra note 124, at 1402
(“[Wjhen the Court defines corruption, it inescapably puts forward a conception of the prop
er role of a legislator in a democracy.”).
129 Indeed, she gestures in this direction when she criticizes contribution limits on the
ground that “contributions may be consistent with some notions of democratic theory.” Sul
livan, supra note 24, at 681 n.56.
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cratic theories. But even complete deregulation would not get us out of
the theoretical box. If there were no campaign finance restrictions at all,
individuals and groups would try to influence elections in whatever
manner they thought was most beneficial to their interests. Candidates
then would be elected, and policies enacted, based on the interplay of all
of these individuals’ and groups’ activities.130 But this is not a descrip
tion of a political process divorced from democratic theory. Rather, it is
an account of some kind of pluralism—“the aggregation of selfregarding interests, each of which is free to seek as much representation
as possible,” as Sullivan puts it.131 Deregulation thus involves exactly
the same sort of democratic choice as regulation.
Next, Post sets forth a complex theory of the First Amendment that
distinguishes between the general domain of public discourse and an ar
ray of specific managerial domains. In public discourse, people freely
“participat[e] in the ongoing and never-ending formation of public opin
ion,”13" and so come to “believe that government is potentially respon
sive to their views.”1” Post refers to this belief in the government’s re
sponsiveness as “democratic legitimation,” and he considers its creation
the central purpose of public discourse.134 In a managerial domain, on
the other hand, “speech may be regulated in order to achieve the instru
mental goals of the domain.”135 In the managerial domain of elections,
for instance, Post posits the goal of “electoral integrity,” by which he
means elections that produce “popular trust that representatives are re
sponsive to public opinion.”136
Assuming that campaign speech is part of public discourse, then, the
problem with the alignment approach is that it requires public opinion to
be measured and then compared to some governmental output. But pub
lic discourse “conceptualizes public opinion as a continuous process,” as
an “unending unfolding” that “can never be decisively known or
fixed.”1'7 Therefore any effort to gauge (and then apply) public opinion

0 The actual preferences of voters also would play some role, even in a wholly deregulat
ed system.
Sullivan, supra note 24, at 681; see also id. (“Campaign finance reformers necessarily
reject pluralist assumptions about the operation of democracy . . . . ”).
132 Post, supra note 25, at 36.
133 Id. at 49.
134 See id.
135 Id. at 81.
136 Id. at 66.
137 Id. at 53-54.
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is doomed. “There is . . . no ‘baseline’ from which [misalignment] can
be assessed . . . no Archimedean point[] from which to normalize the
content of public opinion.” 138
Post’s conception of public opinion warrants several responses. First,
as an empirical matter, political scientists have found that it is not nearly
as volatile as he suggests. One landmark study, for example, concluded
that Americans’ policy preferences “form meaningful patterns consistent
with a set of underlying beliefs and values” and “do not in fact change in
a capricious, whimsical, or evanescent fashion .” 139 Second, even if pub
lic opinion is highly fluid, the applicability of the alignment approach is
not undermined as a result. The approach holds that voters’ views and
governmental outputs should be congruent over time. If voters’ views
change from one period to the next, then so should the outputs. The ap
proach can cope with shifting public opinion. 140 And third, Post repeat
edly argues that there is no way to tell if public opinion is “distorted”—
indeed, this is the thrust of his critique . 141 But the concept of alignment
does not rely on a notion of “undistorted” public opinion. It takes public
opinion as it finds it, and merely claims that officeholders’ positions and
policy outcomes should correspond to it. 142
A different kind of answer to Post focuses not on public opinion but
rather on the value of democratic legitimation that underpins public dis
course. Democratic legitimation, crucially, is in essence a subjective
form of alignment. It is people’s belief that government is responsive to

138 Id.; see also id. at 156 (claiming that alignment approach “has no intrinsic answer to the
obvious question: Who are the People?”).
139 Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in
Americans’ Policy Preferences 384-85 (1992); see also, e.g., Stuart N. Soroka & Christo
pher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in Representation, 41 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 319,
319-25 (2008) (showing respondents’ coherent and stable preferences for taxing and spend
ing levels over time); Joseph Daniel Ura & Christopher R. Ellis, Income, Preferences, and
the Dynamics of Policy Responsiveness, 41 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 785, 787-89 (2008) (show
ing same for respondents’ overall policy liberalism).
40 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 312-13.
141 See, e.g., Post, supra note 25, at 54 (“[Ljimiting speech to prevent distortion is equiva
lent to freezing public opinion and preventing it from changing in response to new ideas and
new convictions.”).
142 The one exception is the category of misalignment that hinges on divergence from the
hypothetical voter exposed to more even campaign outlays. I concede, however, that this
type of misalignment is not a legitimate concern under current law. See supra notes 41-^42
and accompanying text.

1452

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1425

their views, while alignment is the reality of a responsive government.143
Subjective and objective alignment may diverge, of course, but the more
reasonable hypothesis (in the absence of empirical evidence) is that they
typically coincide.144 It is hard to imagine, after all, what could be more
likely to produce a feeling of alignment than actual alignment. As Jus
tice Stevens remarked in Citizens United, a “[government captured by
corporate interests,” and so misaligned in their favor, also may cause
people to “believe” that it is “neither responsive to their needs nor will
ing to give their views a fair hearing.”145 Accordingly, it may be possible
to reconcile Post’s theoretical framework with the alignment approach in
a fairly straightforward fashion. If public discourse sometimes may be
regulated for the sake of democratic legitimation, perhaps it also may be
regulated for the sake of the alignment from which legitimation arises.146
A final reply to Post builds on his observation that campaign speech
could be conceptualized not as part of public discourse but instead as
part of the managerial domain of elections. This domain’s boundaries
are elastic, and, in Post’s words, they could be “enlarged to authorize
control of [money in politics] that threatens] electoral integrity.”14' If
the proper rubric is the electoral domain, not public discourse, then there
are two further ways to reconcile Post’s theory with the alignment ap
proach. First, the goal Post specifies for the domain, electoral integrity,
is very similar to the value of democratic legitimation that is secured by
public discourse. (The only difference between them is that integrity re-

143 See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. I note that I am treating alignment
and responsiveness as synonymous here, while in fact they have different technical defini
tions. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 299-302 (discussing these concepts’ differ
ences).
144 Because it only has become possible very recently to measure objective alignment, no
study to date has investigated the relationship between it and subjective alignment (which
can be assessed using polls).
145 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added); see also Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 507-08 (Souter, J., dissenting) (ar
guing that “integrity . . . of democratic government” is “derived from the responsiveness of
its law to the interests of citizens”).
146 Post partially concedes this point when he observes that “there might be little differ
ence” between his own framework and something akin to the alignment approach. Post, su
pra note 25, at 156. They may be “simply using different words to describe the identical
phenomenon.” Id.
147 Id. at 91; see also Briffault, supra note 63, at 1763 (arguing for “a distinctive jurispru
dential regime for election speech”); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1803, 1817 (1999) (also arguing for
electoral domain detached from general First Amendment principles).
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lies on elections to produce a sense of responsiveness, while legitimation
relies on civic participation,148) Consequently, if alignment can function
as a means for achieving legitimation in the realm of public discourse, it
should be able to do the same for integrity in the electoral domain. There
is no reason to expect alignment to have different connections to these
highly related, almost equivalent, aims.
Second, once we find ourselves in the electoral domain, Post’s goal of
electoral integrity is entitled to no particular deference. The ends of
managerial domains are “democratically determined, ” 149 and there is no
evidence that the public prefers integrity over, say, alignment. In fact,
while I am aware of no polling on the popularity of integrity, two recent
surveys found that a substantial majority of Americans support the dele
gate model of representation (to which alignment is closely tied) over
the trustee model. 150 The democratic legitimacy of alignment thus is at
least as robust as that of integrity.
Moreover, putting aside the vagaries of public opinion, electoral in
tegrity is an odd choice for an objective because it does not appear to be
linked to any aspect of campaign finance. Political scientists have de
tected no relationship whatsoever between levels of electoral spending
or types of electoral regulation and people’s trust in government (a pass
able proxy for integrity) . 151 In contrast, as detailed in Part III, both levels
of spending and types of regulation are connected to alignment in intui-

148 See supra notes 133-134, 136 and accompanying text.
1411 Post, supra note 25, at 81.
150 See Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice
and the Broken Promise of American Democracy 59 (2012); Mollyann Brodie et al., Polling
and Democracy: “The Will of the People,” Pub. Persp., July/Aug. 2001, at 1, 12; see also
Cain, supra note 63, at 121 (referring to “more widely accepted[] delegate model”).
151 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Citizens Deflected: Electoral Integrity and Political Re
form, in Citizens Divided, supra note 25, at 141, 144; Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lainmie,
Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Consti
tutional Law, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 122 (2004) (finding that “trends in general attitudes of
corruption seem unrelated to anything happening in the campaign finance system”); David
M. Primo, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus Reality, 7 Indep. Rev.
207, 215 (2002) (finding no relationship between trust in government and campaign spend
ing). There also is no obvious connection between campaign finance and people’s belief that
government listens to their views. Indeed, “[p]ublic belief in the responsiveness of the gov
ernment appears to have risen during a period of increased campaign spending and soft
money fundraising.” John Samples, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform 115 (2006)
(emphasis added); see also Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform
88-94 (2013) (finding that public’s attitudes toward political system are largely unaffected
by campaign finance reforms).
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tive and empirically verifiable ways.152 Alignment thus has a clear prac
tical advantage over integrity. Unlike integrity, it indeed is threatened by
money in politics, and promoted by certain kinds of reform.
II. T h e D is t in c t iv e n e s s o f A l ig n m e n t

Even if the alignment interest is permitted by First Amendment theo
ry, it is not yet out of the conceptual minefield. The possibility remains
that it might be indistinguishable from one of the multiple interests the
Court has either rejected or downplayed in its campaign finance deci
sions. In this case, the theoretical availability of alignment would be ir
relevant. In order to recognize it, the Court would be obligated to over
turn its precedents and to resuscitate one of the stricken interests— in
short, to launch a doctrinal revolution. Even for a future Court more
amenable to regulation than the current Justices, this would be a tall or
der.
In this Part, then, I explain why alignment is distinct from the three
key interests—anti-corruption, anti-distortion, and equality—that have
made appearances in the Court’s case law.153 First, as to corruption,
there simply is no connection between misalignment and quid pro quo
corruption (the only variant accepted by today’s Court). Misalignment is
more closely related to undue influence corruption (endorsed by the
Court in the early 2000s), but it still is not the same thing. The undue in
fluence of donors is, at most, one of several means that can produce the
end of misalignment. Second, as to distortion, the term (as used by the
Court) refers to the skewing of electoral outcomes due to asymmetric
campaign spending. It has nothing to do with how money in politics may
affect officeholders’ positions or policy outcomes.
And third, equality comes in various forms, but none of them is syn
onymous with alignment. Equality of candidate resources is an entirely
orthogonal goal; there is no reason why evenly funded candidates should
be any more aligned with voters than unevenly funded ones. Equality of
representation actually is inconsistent with alignment. For there to be
any kind of congruence with the median voter, there must be noncongruence with voters at all other points in the spectrum. And equality

152 See infra Part III.
153 Presumably, no one would claim that alignment is identical to the informational interest
that the Court has recognized. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914-16 (2010)
(discussing this interest).
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of voter influence may be conducive to the achievement of alignment,
but it too is one of several possible means, not the end itself. It also is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for alignment to be real
ized.
A. Anti-Corruption
The prevention of corruption is, without a doubt, the most prominent
interest in the campaign finance case law. On one occasion, the Court
even labeled it “the only legitimate and compelling government inter
e st] thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”154 However,
the prominence of the anti-corruption interest is matched by the Court’s
vacillation over how best to construe it. In Buckley itself and for about a
decade thereafter, the Court mostly limited the concept to quid pro quo
corruption—the explicit exchange of “dollars for political favors.”155 In
the early 2000s, the Court broadened its definition to include “undue in
fluence on an officeholder’s judgment.”156 It was in this period that the
Court acknowledged “the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors”157 and “the danger that officehold
ers will decide issues.. . according to the wishes of those who have
made large financial contributions.”158 And, coming full circle, the Court
has reverted to its quid pro quo conception over the last few years. In
McCutcheon, the Court baldly declared that “Congress may target only a
specific type of corruption— ‘quid pro quo’’ corruption.”159
What is the relationship, then, between alignment and quid pro quo
corruption? In brief, there is (next to) none. Alignment refers to the con-

154 FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985).
155 Id. at 497; see also, e.g., id. (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro
quo . . . .”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam) (“To the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo . . . the integrity of our system
of representative democracy is undermined”). Hints of a broader notion of corruption, how
ever, can be found even in these early cases. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (referring to “corruption of elected representatives through
the creation of political debts”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70 (discussing “[t]he Government’s
interest in deterring . . . the undue influence of large contributors on officeholders”).
156 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001).
157Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
158 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).
159 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g.,
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (stating that anti-corruption interest is
“limited to quid pro quo corruption”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478-79
(2007) (plurality opinion).
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gruence of voters’ policy preferences with representatives’ positions or
enacted policy.160 Quid pro quo corruption refers to transactions in
which money (or some other tangible asset) is traded overtly for a politi
cian’s vote (or some other beneficial action).161 The two concepts are
wholly unrelated. The former is concerned with the level of correspond
ence between a given popular input and a given governmental output.
The latter scrutinizes how exactly a politician is paying back someone
who has given her something of value. Unfortunately for the alignment
interest, it cannot be shoehomed into the one rationale for campaign fi
nance regulation that the current Court unquestionably accepts.
The reason there may be a hint of a connection between the two con
cepts is that quid pro quo corruption may give rise to misalignment. If a
politician votes a certain way because of a monetary benefit she re
ceived, but would have cast a different and more congruent vote had she
not received the benefit, then the quid pro quo exchange induced the
non-congruence. But, as noted earlier, quid pro quo corruption appears
to be quite rare in contemporary America.162 The misaligning effect it
could have on the political process thus is relatively limited.
In contrast, alignment has a much stronger link to undue influence
corruption. To say that politicians are “too compliant with” their con
tributors’ preferences,163 and inclined to “decide issues .. . according to”
them,164 in essence is to say that politicians’ and donors’ positions are
aligned. And as long as donors and voters have divergent views, politi
cians who are aligned with the former must be wAaligned with the latter.
To be unduly influenced by donors means not to be influenced enough
by voters.166 It is because of this tight connection that I earlier cited the
Court’s undue influence cases as the best evidence of the alignment ap
proach in the Court’s doctrine.166 If a future Court were ever to adopt the
approach, it likely would rely heavily on these decisions.

160 See supra notes 3SM4 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Burke, supra note 125, at 130
(referring to quid pro quo corruption as “trades of votes for money”); Yasmin Dawood,
Classifying Corruption, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 103,122 (2014) (same).
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
163 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
164 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).
165 See Dawood, supra note 161, at 125 (“The wrong of undue influence . . . is that elected
officials are disproportionately responsive to the wishes of large donors as compared to other
constituents.”).
166 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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But despite these parallels, misalignment and undue influence corrup
tion are not identical. First, even if contributors’ undue influence is the
only mechanism that results in misalignment, it remains just that: a
mechanism, not the outcome itself. The Court thus could recognize
alignment as a compelling interest without having to revise its concep
tion of corruption. Ends are different from means. Second, contributors’
undue influence is not, of course, the only mechanism that generates
misalignment. Within the campaign finance field, it is not just donors
but also spenders who may have a misaligning impact. If candidates
align their positions with those of spenders who advocate for their elec
tions, then misalignment ensues without any undue influence by donors.
And outside the realm of money in politics, there exist a host of addi
tional misaligning forces. Even in the absence of any undue influence,
partisan pressures, legislative rules, gerrymandered districts, and so on
would still cause significant non-congruence. 167
Third, contributors’ undue influence does not even necessarily pro
duce misalignment. If donors and voters have the same policy prefer
ences, then extra sway for donors does not translate into diminished pull
for voters. As discussed in Part III, donors and voters typically do not
have the same ideal point distributions168—but the fact that donors’ un
due influence would not give rise to misalignment if they did further
demonstrates that the concepts are distinct. And fourth, at least in my
view, the terminology of alignment is substantially clearer than that of
undue influence. The Court’s phrase does not tell us how much influ
ence is due to donors, nor does it help with the measurement of either
donors’ or voters’ hold over politicians. Alignment, on the other hand,
plainly calls for the comparison of voters’ policy preferences with of
ficeholders’ positions and actual policy outcomes. Both the inputs and
the outputs in this formulation can be quantified and then matched
against each other. 169
All of this analysis also applies to a version of the anti-corruption in
terest recently introduced by Lessig. Fie begins with the premise that
representatives (especially members of the U.S. House) are meant to be

167 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 323-36, 342-56, 360-65.
168 See infra Part III.
169 See infra Part III; see also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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“dependent on the people alone.”170 But because of their unending need
for campaign funds, they now are dependent on not just the people but
also the donors who supply these funds.171 The result is a “dependence
corruption” in which elected officials who are supposed to depend ex
clusively on one body (“the people”) also have become dependent on
another (“the funders”). 17‘ In Lessig’s view, the governmental interest in
preventing dependence corruption is compelling, and it justifies regula
tions including contribution limits and public financing (but not ex
penditure limits).173
Like undue influence corruption, dependence corruption is closely
tied to misalignment. When politicians are dependent on donors, they
are likely to be aligned with them, and so misaligned with voters.174 But
like undue influence corruption, dependence corruption also is not
equivalent to misalignment. In fact, all four of the distinctions between
undue influence corruption and misalignment also apply to dependence
corruption. First, dependence on donors is one way in which misalign
ment can arise. It is not the end itself. Second, donor dependence is not
the only way in which misalignment can arise. Spender dependence can
be just as misaligning as donor dependence.175 Third, donor dependence
does not necessarily produce misalignment. As Lessig notes, if donors
and voters have the same preferences, then “a dependence upon ‘con
tributors’ could in effect be the same as a dependence upon voters.”176
And fourth, dependence corruption does not convert easily into a doctri-

170 Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102
Calif. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2014) (quoting The Federalist No. 52, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossitered., 1961)).
171 See id.; see also Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F.
61, 65 (2013) (“Politicians in our system have become dependent upon their funders. Their
‘funders’ are not ‘the people.’”).
172 See Lessig, supra note 171, at 65.
See Lessig, supra note 170, at 19 (noting that “compelling interest” “would obviously
support public funding systems” and “would plainly justify aggregate contribution limits”);
id. at 20-21 (noting that interest “would not revive Austin v. Michigan Chamber o f Com
merce” and “would also not reverse Citizens United v. FEC').
See Lessig, supra note 171, at 68 (explaining that dependence corruption makes “repre
sentatives responsive to funders first, and only then to citizens”).
See Bruce E. Cain, Is “Dependence Corruption” the Solution to America’s Campaign
Finance Problems?, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 37, 43 (2014) (pointing out that “outside spending
often reinforces a very specific connection between the candidate’s successful election and
the group’s interests and issues”); Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption,
and the Proxy War over Coordination, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1,2 (2014).
176 Lessig, supra note 63, at 243.
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nal standard. It provides no guidance as to how dependence (on donors
or on voters) actually is to be assessed.177
A final divergence between misalignment and dependence corruption
relates to their policy prescriptions. Both theories support the validity of
contribution limits on individuals (which are aligning and also reduce
politicians’ dependence on donors).178 But Lessig states that his ap
proach would uphold public financing programs, while the alignment
approach would not shield the many such programs whose effects are
ambiguous or misaligning.179 Lessig also maintains that his approach
would not ratify expenditure limits, while the alignment approach would
permit them if their impact is aligning.180 Accordingly, the contrasts be
tween the methods are not so many angels dancing on the head of a pin.
They are distinctions that make a difference.
B. Anti-Distortion
A second interest that has appeared in the campaign finance case law
is the prevention of electoral distortion. This interest first emerged in
pre-Buckley decisions such as Automobile Workers, in which the Court
expressed concern about the “deleterious influences on federal elections
resulting from . . . large aggregations of capital.”181 It also turned up in
decisions in the first decade after Buckley, in which the Court worried
that the “corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth” would
undermine the “integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.”182 But the
interest did not come into its own until the 1990 case of Austin v. Michi
gan Chamber o f Commerce, 183 which upheld Michigan’s ban on cam
paign expenditures by corporations. The Court famously expounded on
the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
177 See Cain, supra note 175, at 44 (“Would the empirical evidence for dependence corrup
tion be easier to find than quid pro quo corruption? I doubt it.”). Lessig’s one suggestion for
how to measure dependence is to examine the time candidates spend fundraising. See Lessig,
supra note 171, at 65.
' 78 See supra note 173; see also infra Part IV.
179 See supra note 173; see also infra Part IV.
180 See supra note 173; see also infra Part IV.
181 United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957); see also, e.g., Pipefitters
Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972) (noting interest in “eliminat[ing] the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections”); United States v. C.I.O., 335
U.S. 106, 115 (1948).
182 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); see, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
183 494 u.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.” 184 Austin, however, stood for only two
decades. Its holding that corporate expenditures could be limited was re
versed in Citizens United—and the anti-distortion interest on which its
holding rested was rejected as well.185
For present purposes, the crucial point about distortion is that, at least
as understood by the Court, it refers to the skewing of electoral out
comes due to large expenditures. Distortion occurs, in the Court’s view,
when wealthy entities spend heavily during a campaign and thus induce
some number of voters to cast their ballots differently than they would
have under conditions of more even outlays. This conception explains
why the Austin Court concluded its opinion by warning of the “threat
that huge corporate treasuries . . . will be used to influence unfairly the
outcome of elections.”186 It also explains why the Court, in other cases,
highlighted the “governmental interest in reducing. . . the influence of
wealth on the outcomes of elections”187 and the risk that “wealthy and
powerful” entities “may drown out other points of view” and “exert an
undue influence on the outcome of a . . . vote.”188 As Julian Eule has ob
served, Austin's, theory was that “corporations spoke too loudly and
wielded too much influence on the electorate.”189
The definition of distortion matters because if the term denotes the
skewing of electoral outcomes due to large expenditures, then it does not
denote misalignment. Misalignment, again, is the lack of fit between
voters’ policy preferences and key governmental outputs. It accepts vot
ers’ preferences as they are, without seeking to convert them to some

Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. The Court dubbed this distortion “a different type of corruption
in the political arena.” Id.
185 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903-08.
186Austin, 494 U.S. at 669.
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 755 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see, e.g„ McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 274 (2003) (Thomas, J„ concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he ‘corrosive and distorting effects’ described
in Austin are that corporations . . . will be able to convince voters of the correctness of their
ideas.”).
188 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (noting this risk but not
finding it present on facts of case).
Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990
Sup. Ct. Rev. 105, 109; see, e.g., Briffault, supra note 32, at 922 (“Austin was rooted in con
cern to protect the political equality of voters from corporate war chests___”); Issacharoff,
supra note 63, at 122; Lessig, supra note 170, at 12.
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sort of pure or unadulterated state. 190 It also compares voters’ prefer
ences to products of the political process such as officeholders’ positions
and actual policy outcomes. In contrast, Austin-style distortion does not
take voters’ views as it finds them. Its central aim is to determine how
asymmetric spending changes these views relative to a hypothetical
benchmark of more even outlays. 191 Austin-style distortion also is indif
ferent to the positions that representatives adopt and the policies that in
fact are enacted. Public opinion is its sole focus—not, as with misalign
ment, merely one side of the equation. Accordingly, it seems clear that
Austin-style distortion and misalignment are not the same thing. The
former cares only about the effect of campaign money on voters; the lat
ter only about its impact on officeholders. 192
To be sure, Austin-style distortion is not the only kind of distortion
that one could imagine. 193 For instance, one could define an aligned po
litical system—a system in which voters’ policy preferences are congru
ent with key governmental outputs—as an undistorted state. Then any
divergence from this state (that is, any misalignment) would constitute
distortion. 194 But the availability of such conceptual moves is not partic
ularly relevant. The anti-distortion interest does not encompass every
sort of skew that a commentator can concoct. Rather, it includes only the
specific phenomenon that the Court has described in its decisions on
money in politics: the shifting of voters’ preferences as a result of lop
sided campaign spending. Whatever the case may be for other types of
distortion, this phenomenon simply is not misalignment.19’
190 But see supra notes 41—42 (discussing another form of misalignment, not advocated
here, that does involve distortion of voters’ preferences due to uneven spending).
191 See Sullivan, supra note 24, at 677 (“[T]he concept of ‘distortion’ assumes a baseline of
‘undistorted’ voter views and preferences.”).
192 Cf. Lessig, supra note 170, at 15 (also distinguishing between “two paradigms—
regulating speech that corrupts government officials (constitutional) and regulating speech
said to corrupt citizens (unconstitutional)”).
193 See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1045, 1078 (1985) (noting indeterminacy of
concept of distortion); David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in
Campaign Finance, 9 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 236, 277 (1991) (“The problem, of course, is in
defining when the marketplace is . . . ‘distorted’ .. . .”).
194 Cf. Richard L. Ffasen, Fixing Washington, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 550, 572 (2012) (book
review) (claiming that “Lessig’s idea that campaign money distorts policy outcomes sounds
very much like the language used by the Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce”).

195 Cf. Hasen, supra note 27, at 311 (conceding that Lessig’s position “differs in some par
ticulars from the equality argument in Austin”).
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C. Equality
The final interest in the campaign finance case law—one long cham
pioned by liberals196 but never accepted by a majority of the Court—is
equality. In Buckley, the Court considered equality justifications for ex
penditure limits on candidates and on individuals.197 It spumed the justi
fications in both cases, declaring in perhaps the field’s best-known line
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some ele
ments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”198 The Court adhered to its po
sition on candidate equality in subsequent cases such as Davis v. FECm
and Bennett. In Bennett, faced with a “trigger” provision that allocated
matching funds to publicly financed candidates if their opponents spent
heavily, the Court commented that “it is not legitimate for the govern
ment to attempt to equalize electoral opportunities in this manner.”200
The Court also stuck to its guns on individual equality in Citizens Unit
ed. Quoting Buckley, it reaffirmed that “the Government has [no] inter
est ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influ
ence the outcome of elections.’”201
From these decisions (as well as the academic literature), we can
glean three kinds of equality. The first is equality of candidate resources,
referred to by Flasen and Daniel Lowenstein as equality of outputs?02
This sort of equality is present when candidates have the same amount
of money to spend in their campaigns, but is absent when one candidate
enjoys a financial advantage over her opponent. The second, only hinted

6 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of
Campaign Finance, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1204, 1204 (1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz,
The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elec
tions, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1160, 1162 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unin
tended Consequences, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1390, 1392 (1994).
1,7 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 439—59 (1976) (per curiam).
128 Id. at 48-49; see also id. at 49 n.55 (rejecting position that “First Amendment permits
Congress to abridge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in order to
enhance the relative voice of other segments of our society”).
199 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
200 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011);
see also Davis, 554 U.S. at 742 (“The argument that a candidate’s speech may be restricted
in order to ‘level electoral opportunities’ has ominous implications . . . . ”).
201 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48).
202 See Hasen, supra note 27, at 312; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic:
Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 Cap. U. L. Rev. 381, 394
(1992).
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at in the doctrine but developed more fully by scholars such as Yasmin
Dawood and Sullivan, is equality of representation. This variant exists
when every voter is represented equally, but not when “elected officials
are disproportionately responsive” to their constituents. ' 03 And the third
is equality of voter influence over the political process, dubbed equality
of inputs by Hasen and Lowenstein.204 Voters have equal influence (at
least from a financial perspective) when they each are able to donate and
spend the same amount of money. But they lack it when some voters are
able to deploy greater resources than others.
Are any of these forms of equality equivalent to alignment? If so, then
alignment would be an illegitimate interest under the Court’s precedent,
but I believe the answer is no. To begin with, equality of candidate re
sources (that is, output equality) is an essentially unrelated concept. A
candidate may disburse just as much money as her opponent during a
campaign, but then flout her constituents’ preferences once in office.
Conversely, a candidate may outspend her opponent (or be outspent),
but then abide by voters’ wishes after being elected. There is no logical
link between a candidate’s relative spending and her subsequent align
ment with her constituents. In fact, there is not even much of a correla
tion between these variables. Even if equal spending produces morecompetitive races, candidates who squeak into office are only barely
more aligned with voters than candidates who prevail in landslides.205 In
addition, the effect of public financing systems that equalize candidate
resources has been to increase misalignment, not to reduce it .206
Next, equality of representation actually is profoundly at odds with
alignment. Alignment is the congruence of governmental outputs with
the views of the median voter. As long as voters diverge in their opin-

203 Dawood, supra note 161, at 125; see also Sullivan, supra note 24, at 678 (referring to
“legislators’ unequal responsiveness to different citizens”).
2“4 See Hasen, supra note 27, at 312; Lowenstein, supra note 202, at 393.
205 See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 136, 145 (2001) (finding that shift from 30% margin of victory to perfect tie
increases candidate convergence by only 0.069 points on 0 to 1 scale); Thomas L. Brunell &
Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District Homogeneity, Political
Competition, and Political Extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962 to 2006, in
Designing Democratic Government: Making Institutions Work 117, 131-32 (Margaret Levi
et al. eds., 2008) (showing almost no relationship between Democratic share of two-party
House vote and House member’s voting record).
206 See infra Section III.C; see also Lessig, supra note 171, at 66 (explaining that policies
that addressed dependence corruption would not produce “equality of candidate funding” but
rather “government-funded inequality”).
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ions, such congruence can be achieved only if there is «o«-congruence
with the views of voters at all other points in the distribution. Alignment
at the median requires misalignment at all other locations. Moreover,
this conclusion holds even if we use Dawood or Sullivan’s formulation
of equal responsiveness,207 When the preferences of the median voter
change, governmental outputs must change in tandem in order to main
tain alignment. But when voters’ preferences shift without affecting the
position of the median, governmental outputs must not shift at all.
Alignment thus is possible only if “elected officials” indeed “are dispro
portionately responsive” to their constituents.208
This leaves us with equality of voter influence, which is precisely the
concept that Hasen claims is indistinguishable from alignment. Align
ment, in his view, amounts to “a call for equality of political inputs,” an
effort “to reduce the voice of some to enhance the relative voice of oth
ers.'”209 Hasen clearly is correct that equality of voter influence and
alignment are related. To see why, assume that candidates’ positions are
entirely a product of the money that voters donate to them or spend on
their behalf. (Assume also that candidates aim to maximize the sum of
these donations and expenditures.210) Under the status quo, different vot
ers deploy vastly different resources, and so candidates’ positions gravi
tate toward the voters with the most funds to offer.211 But in a regime in
which all voters offered the same funding possibilities, candidates would
have a powerful incentive to shift their stances toward the median. The
median is where candidates would be able to secure the most money,
and, by stipulation here, resource maximization drives candidate posiJl7 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. “[R]esponsiveness differs from alignment
in that it refers to the rate at which these outputs change given some shift in public opinion.
Alignment, in contrast, denotes whether or not the outputs are congruent with the public’s
preferences.” Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 301.
Dawood, supra note 161, at 125. The implication of this analysis, of course, is that
equal representation is an unattainable ideal. As long as voters do not all share the same
preferences, governmental outputs inevitably will be better aligned with (and more respon
sive to) some groups’ views than others’. An additional point is that the alignment approach
does treat all voters equally in the initial stage of determining the position of the median. It is
only after this position has been ascertained that the approach begins treating voters unequalI y *209

Hasen, supra note 27, at 312 (making this argument with respect to Lessig’s goal of
preventing dependence corruption); see Cain, supra note 175, at 41 (agreeing that “equality
considerations underlie the particular dependency problem that Lessig is concerned with”).
Assume further that all campaign resources are supplied by voters (and not by parties,
corporations, unions, etc.).
211 See infra Section III.B.
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tioning. Alignment thus would follow naturally from equal voter influence. 212
Despite this connection, alignment and equal voter influence are not
equivalent, largely for reasons that have been alluded to already. First,
even if equal voter influence is a necessary and sufficient condition for
alignment to arise, it still is just a condition, not the actual objective. It
may yield alignment by inducing candidates to move toward the median,
but yielding something is not the same as being something. It thus is be
side the point that a regulation that promotes equal voter influence also
may promote alignment. As Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent in
Bennett, “No special rule of automatic invalidation applies to statutes
having some connection to equality; like any other laws, they pass mus
ter when supported by an important enough government interest.”213
Second, equal voter influence is not a necessary condition for align
ment to arise. Imagine that a jurisdiction randomly selects half of its
voters and gives each of them a sum of money that they must donate or
spend during the next campaign. Imagine also that the jurisdiction bans
the other half of its voters from deploying any electoral resources at all.
The inequality of voter influence in this example could not be starker.
Yet alignment still would ensue because candidates still would have a
strong incentive to shift their positions toward the median. The random
selection would make the distribution of subsidized voters identical to
that of all voters, and thus would preserve the median as the point at
which candidate funding is maximized.214
Third, equal voter influence is not a sufficient condition for alignment
either. If candidates’ stances are wholly a function of the funds deployed
by voters on their behalf, and if there are only two candidates in a race,
then convergence at the median occurs under conditions of perfect input
212 This is a variant of Anthony Downs’s famous argument that vote-maximizing candi
dates will converge on the median voter. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of De
mocracy 114-27 (1957). If candidates’ positions are entirely a function of the funds deployed
on their behalf, and if all voters deploy equal funds, then resource-maximizing candidates
also will converge on the median voter.
213 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2845 (2011)
(Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Hasen, supra note 27, at 308 (“[A] campaign finance law
justified on [legitimate] grounds should not become unconstitutional if the law incidentally
promotes political equality.”); Lessig, supra note 171, at 66-67.
214 This point also stands with respect to certain unequal funding schemes that do not em
ploy random selection. For example, if the half of voters closer to the median received sub
sidies, and the half of voters farther from it were barred from deploying any resources, then
alignment again would follow despite the inequality.
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equality. But the introduction of additional candidates causes this rela
tionship to break down. With three or more contestants, resourcemaximizing candidates gamer more funds by positioning themselves at
different points along the spectrum, not by clustering in the middle
(where they can be outflanked by their opponents). As Gary Cox has ex
plained, “when there are more than two candidates competing under
[standard American rules], equilibria are noncentrist; rational [resource]seeking politicians have an incentive to avoid bunching at the medi
an.”215
Finally, the assumption on which the link between equal voter influ
ence and alignment relies—that candidates’ positions stem from the
funds donated to or spent for them by voters, and from nothing else—is
obviously wrong. Candidates’ positions actually stem from all sorts of
other sources too: their own ideologies, their parties’ platforms, fran
chise and party regulations, the views (rather than dollars) of their pri
mary and general electorates, etc.216 In the real world, then, alignment
does not necessarily follow from equal voter influence, even if candi
dates are hungry for resources and there are only two candidates per
race. Equal voter influence may have an aligning effect, but so too may
several other factors, and its impact easily may be offset by forces push
ing in the opposite direction. Accordingly, equal voter influence has no
stronger claim to constituting alignment itself than do any of the other
aligning elements that dot the electoral landscape. It simply is one such
element among many.217
III. T h e E m p ir ic s o f A l ig n m e n t

It is not enough, though, to show that alignment is conceptually dis
tinct from the anti-corruption, anti-distortion, and equality interests. No
matter which interest is asserted in a campaign finance case, the Court
carefully scrutinizes the connection between the interest and the policy

215 Gary W. Cox, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems, 34 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 903, 912 (1990).
216 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 323-36, 342-56, 360-65.
217 Moreover, even if all of this analysis is unconvincing and equal voter influence still
seems identical to alignment, the Court may be more receptive to arguments about input (ra
ther than output) equality. See Hasen, supra note 65, at 1003; Lowenstein, supra note 202, at
395 (noting that “the [Court’s] hostility seems to have been directed primarily at equality of
outputs”).

2015]

Aligning Campaign Finance Law

1467

that is being defended.218 For alignment to serve as a viable rationale, it
thus must be established that money in politics produces misalignment,
and that the regulation of such money promotes alignment. The burden
of proof also is heavier for alignment than for other, more familiar inter
ests. As the Court made clear in Shrink Missouri, “The quantum of em
pirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny . . . will
vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification
raised .” 219
In this Part, then, I survey the empirical evidence on both the misa
ligning effects of campaign finance and the aligning effects of campaign
finance reform. This evidence—most of which has emerged only in the
last few years220—falls into three main categories. First, numerous stud
ies examine the relationship between governmental outputs and the pref
erences of poor, middle-class, and rich Americans. Most of them find
that the outputs are tied more closely to the wishes of the rich than to
those of any other group. Second, a smaller set of studies address the
same issue but with respect to donors as opposed to non-donors. Their
results are even more unequivocal: The influence of donors dwarfs that
of non-donors. And third, a handful of very recent studies explore the
implications of campaign finance regulations for alignment. They con
clude that individual contribution limits and certain kinds of public fi
nancing are aligning, but that party and PAC contribution limits and oth
er kinds of public financing are misaligning. Because of the emphasis
that Shrink Missouri placed on actual data, I review this scholarship at
some length in the pages that follow.

218 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) (holding that
contribution limits must be “closely drawn” to serve “sufficiently important interest”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44^15 (1976) (applying “exacting scrutiny” to expenditure limits).
219 Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 391; see also Renata Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Between Ac
cess and Influence: Building a Record for the Next Court, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y
211,214 (2014) (“A strong record is essential both to document the interests served by legis
lation, and to show that it is appropriately tailored.”); Strauss, supra note 58, at 1388, 1389.
220 A landmark 2005 report lamented that “political scientists have paid less attention to
issues of differential government responsiveness than they should,” and declared that
“[n]owhere is the need for additional, more sophisticated research more obvious than for un
derstanding how . . . flows of money affect U.S. politics and governance.” Lawrence R. Ja
cobs & Theda Skocpol, Studying Inequality and American Democracy: Findings and Chal
lenges, in Inequality and American Democracy: What We Know and What We Need to
Leam 214, 220, 222 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). Much of the re
search that I discuss in this Part was undertaken in response to this report.
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A. The Influence o f the Affluent
The topic of differential representation by income group burst onto
the political science stage with the 2008 publication of Larry Bartels’s
Unequal Democracy,221 Like many scholars before him, Bartels quanti
fied voters’ preferences using survey responses and officeholders’ (here
U.S. senators’) positions using roll call votes.2” But, unlike most previ
ous work, Bartels did not treat public opinion as a single undifferentiated
mass. Instead, he computed separate estimates of the attitudes of lowincome, middle-income, and high-income respondents.223 Analyzing the
links between these estimates and senators’ voting records, he found that
the views of the poor exerted no influence whatsoever, the views of the
middle-class exerted a modest influence, and the views of the rich exert
ed a much greater influence.224 As he summed up his results (which are
displayed in Figure 2), “senators in this period [1989-1994] were vastly
more responsive to affluent constituents than to constituents of modest
means.”225
Bartels’s finding of misalignment226 in favor of the rich subsequently
was extended in multiple directions by other scholars. First, Christopher
Ellis,227 Jesse Rhodes and Brian Schaffner,228 and Chris Tausanovitch227
all determined that House members’ voting records also are more re-

2-1 Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age
(2008) [hereinafter Bartels, Unequal Democracy], Earlier work by both Bartels and Martin
Gilens also addressed this topic. See Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political
Representation (Aug. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~
bartels/economic.pdf); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 Pub.
Opinion Q. 778 (2005).
2i2 See Bartels, Unequal Democracy, supra note 221, at 254-55.
223 See id. at 257-58.
224 See id. at 259-62.
223 Id. at 253.
‘ 6 Technically, Bartels analyzed responsiveness, not alignment. See Stephanopoulos, su
pra note 17, at 299-302 (discussing these concepts’ differences).
2-7 See Christopher Ellis, Social Context and Economic Biases in Representation, 75 J.
Pol. 773, 779 (2013) [hereinafter Ellis, Social Context]; Christopher Ellis, Understanding
Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and Policy Representation in the
110th House, 65 Pol. Res. Q. 938, 943 (2012) [hereinafter Ellis, Understanding Biases]; Ellis,
supra note 36, at 7.
“8 See Jesse H. Rhodes & Brian F. Schaffner, Economic Inequality and Representation in
the U.S. House: A New Approach Using Population-Level Data 29 (Apr. 7, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://people.umass.edu/schaffhe/Schaffiier.Rhodes.MPSA.2013.pdf).
" 9 See Chris Tausanovitch, Income and Representation in the United States Congress 22 (un
published manuscript, available at http://ctausanovitch.com/IncomeRepresentation2013.pdf).
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sponsive to the preferences of the affluent than to those of other individ
uals. Rhodes, Schaffner, and Tausanovitch generated especially robust
results by using far larger samples than those to which Bartels had ac
cess: a private vendor’s database of 265 million people in Rhodes and
Schaffner’s case,230 and a “super-survey” combining five earlier surveys
in Tausanovitch’s.231 Ellis, for his part, probed some of the factors that
may explain variations in the level of pro-rich misalignment. He found
that the poor are worst represented “in districts represented by Republi
cans, in districts with high median incomes, and in districts that are electorally safe.”232
Second, in his landmark 2012 book, Affluence and Influence,233 Mar
tin Gilens discovered that there also is outcome (as opposed to prefer
ence) misalignment in favor of the wealthy. Gilens compiled responses
to thousands of survey questions over multiple decades, and used these
responses to estimate income groups’ opinions on a host of national pol
icy issues.234 He then painstakingly tracked whether each policy asked
about by a survey actually was enacted by the federal government dur
ing the next four years.235 With respect to issues about which income
groups disagreed, Gilens found clear responsiveness to the preferences
of respondents at the ninetieth percentile. As their support for a policy
increased, the odds of the policy’s enactment increased steadily as
well.236 But Gilens found no responsiveness at all to the preferences of

230 See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 228, at 2.
231 See Tausanovitch, supra note 229, at 12-13. Tausanovitch also found, however, that if
legislators were equally responsive to all income groups’ preferences, their voting records
would not be dramatically different from the status quo. See id. at 28-32.
232 Ellis, Social Context, supra note 227, at 781; see also Ellis, supra note 36, at 30 (report
ing similar results); John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Voting Power, Policy Representation,
and Disparities in Voting’s Rewards, 75 J. Pol. 52, 56 (2013) (finding that “win ratio” meas
uring likelihood that member of Congress votes consistent with constituent’s preferences is
about 4.5 points higher for high-income earners than for low-income earners); cf. Lawrence
R. Jacobs & Benjamin 1. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
107, 114-15, 117 (2005) (finding that preferences of business leaders have much larger im
pact on positions of foreign policy officials than do preferences of general public).
233 Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in
America (2012).
234 See id. at 50-62.
235 See id. at 60.
236 See id. at 80. Specifically, as the share of respondents at the ninetieth percentile favor
ing a policy rose from 10% to 90%, the odds of the policy’s enactment rose from 10% to
50%. See id.
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respondents at the tenth or fiftieth percentiles.237 As he put it (and as
shown in Figure 2), “when preferences between the well-off and the
poor [or middle-class] diverge, government policy bears absolutely no
relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor [or
middle-class].”238
Figure 2: Findings of Pro-Affluent Misalignment by Bartels239 and
Gilens240
0.6

Responsiveness (Regression Estimate)
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"37 See id. For respondents at both of these percentiles, the odds of a policy’s enactment
stayed constant at about 30% no matter what share of the respondents supported the policy.
Id. at 81; see also Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 Persp. Pol. 564, 570-75 (2014),
available at http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_
2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf (reporting similar results and also de
termining that business-oriented interest groups have larger impact on policy enactment than
mass-based groups).
(39 Bartels, supra note 221, at 52.
240 Gilens, supra note 233, at 80.
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Third, Patrick Flavin241 and Elizabeth Rigby and Gerald Wright242 de
termined that pro-rich outcome misalignment exists at the state level as
well. Flavin analyzed overall policy liberalism, taking into account state
laws in twenty different domains, as well as a series of hot-button issues
such as the death penalty, abortion, and gun control.241 In all of these ar
eas, he found that “citizens with low incomes receive little substantive
political representation in the policy decisions made by state govern
ments.”244 Similarly, Rigby and Wright considered aggregate indices of
state economic and social policy.245 In both cases, they too discovered
greater responsiveness to the preferences of wealthier individuals.246
Lastly, Ellis247 and David Weakliem et al.,248 respectively, studied
how misalignment in favor of the affluent varies temporally and interna
tionally. Ellis calculated the relative proximity to their House members
of individuals in the top income tercile versus individuals in the bottom
income tercile over the 1972-2008 period.249 He found that the represen
tational advantage enjoyed by the wealthy increased fivefold from the
beginning of this era to the end.2’'0 Weakliem et al. examined the extent
to which income inequality in other countries reflects the preferences of
different income groups.281 They determined that, abroad, the views of
individuals at the eightieth income percentile correspond most closely to
levels of inequality, and the views of individuals at the fiftieth and nine-

241 See Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American
States, 40 Am. Pol. Res. 29 (2011).
242 See Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Whose Statehouse Democracy? Policy Re
sponsiveness to Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor Versus Rich States, in Who Gets
Represented 189 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011).
242 See Flavin, supra note 241, at 40-41.
244 Id. at 44. While the coefficients for low-income opinion were always lower than the
coefficients for middle-income and high-income opinion, the latter two coefficients were not
always distinguishable. See id. at 41-45.
245 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 242, at 195-99.
246 See id. at 217. Like Flavin, Rigby and Wright also sometimes found that the coeffi
cients for middle-income and high-income opinion were indistinguishable. See id. at 207-17.
247 See Ellis, supra note 36.
248 See David L. Weakliem et al., By Popular Demand: The Effect of Public Opinion on
Income Inequality, 4 Comp. Soc. 261 (2005).
249 See Ellis, supra note 36, at 5-10.
250 See id. at 9 (noting that representational gap averaged one point from 1972 to 1994 but
five points in 2004 and 2008). But see Gilens, supra note 233, at 201 (finding that rich-poor
gap with respect to outcome alignment peaked in 1980s and was smaller in earlier and later
years).
251 See Weakliem et al., supra note 248, at 265-73.
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ty-ninth percentiles are about equally influential.252 Pro-rich misalign
ment thus exists in other countries, but is not as stark as in America.255
While the conclusion that the rich are better represented than other
classes is widely accepted in the literature, it has been subjected to at
least two critiques. The first is largely data-driven. Scholars such as Pe
ter Enns, Robert Erikson, Stuart Soroka, Joseph Ura, and Christopher
Wlezien have argued that different income groups’ preferences actually
do not diverge very much.254 If this claim is correct, then alignment
cannot vary significantly by income stratum.255 But the claim only
seems to be correct with respect to relatively crude measures of peo
ple’s preferences, such as their ideological self-placement256 and their
views on governmental spending by issue area."'7 More sophisticated
metrics that rely on people’s answers to a battery of policy questions,
of the sort employed by Gilens258 and Tausanovitch259 in particular, in-

252 See id. at 276.
253 Further extensions of Bartels’s initial finding include James N. Druckman & Lawrence
R. Jacobs, Segmented Representation: The Reagan White House and Disproportionate Re
sponsiveness, in Who Gets Represented, supra note 242, at 166, 179-80 (finding that Presi
dent Reagan’s public statements on economic policy best reflected views of wealthy re
spondents to administration’s polls), and Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political
Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 552, 557
(2013) (finding that candidates ’ positions at all levels are most responsive to preferences of
hi|h-income groups).
See Yosef Bhatti & Robert S. Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor Represented in the
U.S. Senate?, in Who Gets Represented, supra note 242, at 223, 236; Peter K. Enns & Chris
topher Wlezien, Group Opinion and the Study of Representation, in Who Gets Represented,
supra note 242, at 1, 4-5; Soroka & Wlezien, supra note 139, at 321; Ura & Ellis, supra note
139, at 785; Christopher Wlezien & Stuart N. Soroka, Inequality in Policy Responsiveness,
in Who Gets Represented, supra note 242, at 285, 287.
255 See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 254, at 233; Soroka & Wlezien, supra note 139, at
325; Ura & Ellis, supra note 139, at 792; Wlezien & Soroka, supra note 254, at 287.
256 See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 254, at 233 (using this approach); cf. Ura & Ellis, su
pra note 139, at 788 (using people’s overall policy liberalism).
257 See Enns & Wlezien, supra note 254, at 5 (using this approach); Soroka & Wlezien,
su|>ra note 139, at 321 (same); Wlezien & Soroka, supra note 254, at 287 (same).
“58 See Martin Gilens, Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation, 42 PS: Pol. Sci.
& Pol. 335, 335 (2009) (noting that his “data set of policy preferences across income groups
covers a far broader range of issues and shows dramatically greater differences between the
preferences of low- and high-income Americans”).
See Tausanovitch, supra note 229, at 15 (explaining that ideal points calculated using
array of policy questions “give[] us more information about the location of individuals in the
policy space” than ideological self-placements); see also Patrick Flavin, Differences in Poli
cy Preference and Priorities Across Income Groups in American Public Opinion 8, 13, 21,
24 (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
(finding that even with respect to governmental spending by issue area, sizeable differences
in income group opinion appear if more specific policies are asked about).
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deed find substantial differences between income groups’ preferences.
The data-driven objection thus appears to be an artifact of less ad
vanced approaches to ascertaining public opinion.
The second critique is that even if there is misalignment in favor of
the rich, it could result from their higher level of non-monetary partici
pation (e.g., voting, volunteering, attending meetings, contacting offi
cials, etc. ) . 260 In this case, the misalignment would be the product not of
money in politics but rather of heightened civic engagement—generally
considered a good thing. This possibility, though, has been considered
explicitly, and then rejected, by both Bartels and Ellis.261 These scholars
ran models in which they included controls for several forms of non
monetary participation (as well as respondents’ education and
knowledge ) .262 These variables often were associated with higher levels
of alignment, but their inclusion never eliminated (or even much damp
ened) the statistical significance of income.*6' In Bartels’s words,
“[significant disparities in responsiveness to rich and poor constituents
do still appear even after allowing for differences attributable to turnout,
knowledge, and contacting.” 264
The inference that Bartels drew from this result is that the larger cam
paign donations of the affluent must explain the misalignment in their
favor.265 Gilens speculated in the same vein in his book, claiming that
“[m]oney—the ‘mother’s milk’ of politics—is the root of representa
tional inequality. ” 266 But neither Bartels nor Gilens, nor any of the other
scholars discussed in this Section, were able to provide any direct sup
port for this hypothesis. I turn in the next Section, then, to scholars who
have mustered actual evidence of the misaligning effects of campaign
260 For some of the voluminous literature on the higher participation of wealthier individu
als, see Schlozman et al., supra note 150, at 15, 124; Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and
the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 Persp. Pol. 51, 54 (2013); Joe Soss & Law
rence R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-Participation in the American Polity, 124 Pol.
Sci. Q. 95, 97 (2009).
261 See Bartels, supra note 221, at 275-81; Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 227, at
944-46.
262 See Bartels, supra note 221, at 275-81; Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 227, at
944-46.
263 See Bartels, supra note 221, at 275-81; Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 227, at
944-46.
264 See Bartels, supra note 221, at 277; see also Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note
227, at 948 (“[Ojnly a small part of this representation gap can be explained by patterns of
participation, knowledge, [or] education . .. .”); cf. Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 228, at
31-32 (finding that result of unequal responsiveness holds even after limiting analysis to
voters).
265 See Bartels, supra note 221, at 280 (“[T]he data are consistent with the hypothesis that
senators represented their campaign contributors to the exclusion of other constituents.”).
266 Gilens, supra note 233, at 10.
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contributions. Their work is the strongest proof to date that the align
ment interest is threatened by money in politics.
B. The Influence o f Donors
If there is one thing that political scientists have learned about the
small slice of Americans who give money to candidates, it is that they
are nothing like their peers who do not give money. With respect to demographics, surveys carried out by Peter Francia et al.,267 Clyde Wilcox
et al., and the Institute for Politics, Democracy, and the Internet269 all
have found that individuals who contribute at least $200 to federal can
didates are “overwhelmingly wealthy, highly educated, male, and
white.” In 2004, for example, 58% of these donors were male, 69%
were older than fifty, 78% had a family income above $100,000, and
91% had a college degree.271 In 2012, these donors amounted to just
0.4% of the population, but supplied 64% of the funds received by can
didates from individuals.272
Likewise, with respect to ideology, study after study has concluded
that donors hold more extreme views than the public at large. While the
ideal point distribution for the public is normal, with a single peak in the
moderate middle,273 the distribution for donors is strikingly bimodal,
with one peak in the far left and another in the far right. This result is
robust to multiple analytic approaches. It holds for donors to congres
sional candidates, whom Joseph Bafumi and Michael Herron274 and

See Francia et a1-’ suPra note 5>at 1 5 (carrying out survey in 1996).
See Clyde Wilcox et al., With Limits Raised, Who Will Give More? The Impact of
BCRA on Individual Donors, in Life After Reform: When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Politics 61 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003) (carrying out survey in 2000).
See Small Donors and Online Giving: A Study of Donors to the 2004 Presidential
Campaigns, Inst, for Pol., Democracy & the Internet 1 (2006), http://www.cfmst.org/
president/pdf/IPDLSmallDonors.pdf [hereinafter IPDI Study] (carrying out survey in 2004).
‘ 0 Francia et al., supra note 5, at 16.
271 See IPDI Study, supra note 269, at 12; see also Francia et al., supra note 5, at 28; Wesley
Y. Joe et al., Do Small Donors Improve Representation? Some Answers from Recent Guberna
torial and State Legislative Elections, 19—20 tbl.l (Aug. 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/APSA_2008_SmallDonors.pdf) (reporting
similar results for donors to state legislative races); Wilcox et al., supra note 268, at 65.
See Donor Demographics, Ctr. for Responsive Pol., https://www.opensecrets.org/
bimicture/DonorDemographics.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
‘ 3 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536-37; Seth E. Masket & Hans Noel, Serving
Two Masters: Using Referenda to Assess Partisan Versus Dyadic Legislative Representa
tion^ 20 Pol. Res. Q. 104, 112 (2011); Shor, supra note 62, at 22.
274 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 537 (showing that donor ideal point distribution
is more bimodal than analogous voter distribution).
268
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Rhodes and Schaffner275 both surveyed. It holds for donors to all candi
dates over the 1972-2012 span of the American National Election Sur
vey, as reported by Michael Barber.276 It holds for donors in all fifty
states, as also reported by Barber based on the Cooperative Congres
sional Election Study.277 And it holds as well if donors’ views are deter
mined not through survey responses but rather through the ideologies of
the candidates to whom they choose to contribute. Using this last ap
proach, Barber, Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, and others have pro
duced charts that reveal the bimodality of donor opinion in arresting de
tail.278
The distinctiveness of donors would matter less if they gave money
for non-ideological reasons (such as personal connections or a desire for
access). In this case, the recipients of the contributions would not neces
sarily be ideologically extreme, and the contributions would not neces
sarily exert a misaligning influence. But surveys carried out by Bar
ber, 9 Wesley Joe et al., 0 and Wilcox et al.281 all found that the most
common reason given by donors for their contributions is candidates’
ideological proximity to them. As Barber put it, “ideological considera
tions are more likely to be rated as extremely important by donors than
access-related motivations or motivations related to personal connec
tions to the candidate.”282 In addition, studies by Barber, Michael
275 See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 228, at 34 (finding that variance of donor opinion
is 50% higher than that of voter opinion).
276 See Barber, supra note 35, at 14 (showing that donors are more extreme than non
donors in each survey year but one); see also id. at 14-16 (showing that donors remain more
ideological even after controls are added for non-monetary forms of participation).
277 See id. at 14-15 (showing that donors are more extreme than non-donors in each state).
278 See Nolan McCarty et al., Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal
Riches 162 (2006) (using soft money donations to national parties); Barber, supra note 35, at
23 (using donations to state legislative candidates); Michael Barber, Access Versus Ideolo
gy: Why PACs and Individuals Contribute to Campaigns 11 (Dec. 3, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (using donations to state and
federal candidates); Bonica, supra note 3, at 26 (finding same bimodal distribution for do
nors generally and Fortune 500 executives specifically); Bonica et al., supra note 5, at 115
(same for small donors, donors in top 0.01% of income distribution, and Forbes 400 and For
tune 500 donors).
279 See Barber, supra note 278, at 10 (surveying donors to congressional candidates in
2012); Michael Barber et al., Presidents, Representation, and Campaign Donors 18-24 (Aug.
2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://staticl.squarespace.com/static/51841c7
3e4b04fc5ce6e8fl5/t/54d24dbce4b01b55b6de2b06/1423068604847/APSA2014_donors_dra
ft3.pdf) (surveying donors to presidential candidates in 2012).
280 See Joe et al., supra note 271, at 22 tbl.3 (surveying donors to state candidates in 2006).
281 Wilcox et al., supra note 268, at 68 (surveying donors to congressional candidates in
2000 and also reporting results of 1996 Francia et al. survey).
282 Barber, supra note 278, at 8.
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Ensley, Bertram Johnson, Raymond La Raja, Walter Stone, and others
all determined that the more extreme candidates are, the more money
they raise from individual donors."8’ Donors’ survey responses, then, are
more than mere words. Their replies are corroborated by their tendency
actually to contribute more heavily to candidates who share their im
moderate views.
In combination, donors’ abundant resources, policy extremism, and
ideological giving contribute to severe misalignment in their favor.
Bafumi and Herron used the voting records of members of Congress and
the survey responses of donors to plot their ideal point distributions in a
common policy space.284 Bonica used data on who gave and received all
disclosed campaign contributions to do the same.28'’ Both studies found
that the distributions of donors and members of Congress are more or
less identical.286 Their distributions are distinctly bimodal, again in
marked contrast to the normal distribution of the general public.282 Simi
larly, Barber used roll call votes and survey responses to determine the
ideal points of senators, voters from each party, and all voters.288 Sena
tors, it turns out, are very distant ideologically from their state’s median
voter (who is represented only slightly better than a voter chosen at ran
dom).289 They are substantially more aligned with the median voter from
their own party.290 But “[ajmong both Republicans and Democrats, the
ideological congruence between senators and donors is nearly per
fect.”" 1(Bonica’s and Barber’s results are displayed in Figure 3.)
See Barber, supra note 35, at 23-28 (analyzing state legislative candidates); Raymond
J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance Laws Increase Fund
ing for Moderates and Challengers? 19-20 (Jan. 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at
https://polsci.umass.edu/uploads/profiles/sites/la-raja_ray/SPSA-LaRaja-Schaffiier-Parties.pdf)

(same); see also Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideol
ogy, 138 Pub. Choice 221, 227 (2009) (analyzing U.S. House candidates); Bertram Johnson,
Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the Ideologically Extreme?, 38 Am.
Pol. Res. 890, 899 (2010) (same); Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate Valence
and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections, 54 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 371, 381 (2010)
(same).
284 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 522-26.
281 See Bonica, supra note 3, at 26-28; see also Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological
Marketplace, 58 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 367, 368-70 (2014) (explaining methodology in more
detail).
™ See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536-37; Bonica, supra note 3, at 29.
See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 6, at 536-37; Bonica, supra note 3, at 29; see also
suPra note 273 and accompanying text (discussing ideal point distribution of public at large).
See Barber, supra note 6, at 10-19.
289 See id. at 19-20.
290 See id. at 20-21.
Id. at 22 (emphasis added). Barber et al. also have found that the positions taken by the
President are much more responsive to same-party donors’ views than to same-party non-
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Figure 3: Findings of Pro-Donor Misalignment by Bonica292 and
Barber293
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donors’ views. In fact, only the former are statistically significant in a model that includes
both sets of views as well as overall public opinion. See Barber et al., supra note 279, at 2829
292 Bonica, supra note 3, at 32.
293 Barber, supra note 6, at 21.
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Barber’s analysis suggests that the proximity of donors’ and office
holders’ views is causal rather than correlational. Since senators repre
sent their donors better than their constituents or their co-partisans, the
sway of campaign contributions must exceed the electoral incentive to
appeal to the median voter or the partisan urge to please fellow party
members.294 Additional evidence along these lines comes from Ellis295
and Rhodes and Schaffner,296 both of whom found that donors’ prefer
ences remain a significant driver of House members’ voting records
even after adding controls for voters’ preferences and various forms of
non-monetary participation. Still more such evidence comes from an ex
perimental study recently conducted by Joshua Kalla and David
Broockman.297 They sent e-mails to House members, half from “local
constituents” and half from “local campaign donors,” asking to meet to
discuss environmental issues.298 Only 5.5% of the constituent e-mails re
sulted in a meeting with the House member or a senior staffer, compared
to 18.8% of the donor e-mails.299 More work on causation is necessary,
but the existing literature does reveal a clear connection between cam
paign giving and misalignment.
Lastly, the misaligning influence of individual donors may be grow
ing over time. As noted earlier, the level of preference misalignment has
surged over the last few decades (at least with respect to the U.S.
House).300 Over the same period, the proportion of fluids supplied to

294 Barber also suggests that legislators’ preferences might resemble those of donors be
cause both groups are more affluent than the non-donating population. Legislators’ bimodal
preference distribution might be attributable to their own affluence, in other words. See id. at
28-32. This hypothesis warrants further investigation, but it cannot fully account for legisla
tors’ bimodality since they are more ideologically extreme than affluent non-donors. Cf.
Barber, supra note 35, at 12-15 (finding that donors are more ideologically extreme than
equally politically active non-donors).
295 See Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 227, at 945^16 (finding that being large
donor increases alignment with House member even after controlling for voting, political
activity, political knowledge, and other factors).
2% See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 228, at 36-38 (finding that donor ideology remains
statistically significant predictor of House member ideology even after controlling for voter
ideology).
“')7 See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Congressional Officials Grant Access to
Individuals Because They Have Contributed to Campaigns: A Randomized Field Experiment
(Mar. 11, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/
~broockma/kalla_broockman_donor_access_field_experiment.pdf).
298 See id. at 7-12.
299 See id. at 16-17.
300 See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.

2015]

Aligning Campaign Finance Law

1479

House candidates by individual donors has increased from about 50% to
nearly 75%.301 The share of individual donors who self-identify as ideo
logically extreme also has increased from around 40% to just over
60%.302 These trends may be unrelated, but their juxtaposition still is
striking. If individual donors are becoming both more vital to candidates
and more radical in their views, then what we would expect for misa
lignment is exactly what we have witnessed: a steady, seemingly inexo
rable rise.
C. The Impact o f Reform
That money in politics is misaligning, however, is only half the story.
For the alignment interest to be a valid justification for campaign fi
nance regulations, these policies actually must be aligning. If their ef
fects are ambiguous (or worse), then they lack the tight connection with
alignment that is necessary for them to be upheld on this basis.303 1 con
clude this Part, then, by discussing a series of very recent studies on the
aligning implications of contribution limits on individuals, parties, and
PACs as well as different kinds of public financing. This literature only
now is emerging because the techniques for measuring voters’ and of
ficeholders’ preferences previously did not exist.304
But before getting to the studies’ findings, it is important to complete
the survey, begun above, of campaign funders’ ideological inclinations.
It should be clear by now that individual donors tend to be ideologically
extreme, with starkly bimodal ideal point distributions. But what about
the other two key sources of money in politics, parties and PACs?’05
What do their policy preferences look like? Starting with parties, La Ra
ja and Schaffner found that their views, at least as reflected in their

301 See Barber & McCarty, supra note 35, at 31; see also Barber, supra note 35, at 21-23
(showing similar increase for state legislative candidates).
302 See La Raja & Wiltse, supra note 34, at 510. Perhaps relatedly, the share of campaign
contributions supplied by the richest 0.01% of Americans has skyrocketed from about 10%
in 1980 to about 40% in 2012. See Bonica et al., supra note 5, at 112.
303 See supra note 218 (discussing stringent scrutiny applied by courts when campaign fi
nance regulations are challenged).
304 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 303 (noting recent development of these tech
niques).
305 In combination, individual donors, parties, and PACs account for essentially all of the
contributions that candidates receive. See Barber, supra note 35, at 22 (showing trends in
these funding sources over time for state legislative candidates); Barber & McCarty, supra
note 35, at 31-32 (same for congressional candidates).
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committees’ campaign contributions, are strikingly centrist. Parties do
nate about twice as much money to candidates in the middle of the polit
ical spectrum as they do to candidates at the edges.306 The distribution of
party giving by candidate ideology (shown in Figure 4) is distinctly
normal, with a mode very near the ideological midpoint.307 O f course,
the reason for this pattern is not that parties prefer moderate over liberal
or conservative policies. They plainly do not. Rather, the reason is that
“parties put a premium on winning elections,” and moderate candidates
are more likely to prevail at the polls than extreme ones.308
Turning next to PACs, their ideologies (for the most part) are centrist
as well. Barber300 and Bonica310 both used the positions of the candidates
to whom PACs contribute to estimate the groups’ ideal points. The re
sulting distributions were normal and unimodal in every case: for PACs
that donated to state legislative candidates from 1996 to 2012,311 for
PACs that donated to federal candidates in 2012 (shown in Figure 4),312
and for PACs that donated to any candidate over the 1980-2010 peri
od.’1’ Consistent with these findings, Bonica and Andrew Flail both de
termined that moderate candidates raise more money from PACs than do
extreme ones. At the state legislative level, moderates raise about
$12,000 more than liberals and about $7,000 more than conservatives.314
At the U.S. House level, the advantage for moderates is about $46,000

0 See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8, 14 (analyzing party donations to state
senate candidates from 1996 to 2008).
307 See id.
3118Id. at 21; see, e.g., Brandice Canes-Wrone et al„ Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral
Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 127, 133, 135 (2002)
(finding that House incumbents with more extreme voting records are less likely to be
reelected); Anthony Gierzynski & David A. Breaux, The Financing Role of Parties, in Cam
paign Finance in State Legislative Elections 185, 195-200 (Joel A. Thompson & Gary F.
Moncrief eds., 1998) (finding that parties give most heavily to nonincumbent candidates in
competitive races).
300 See Barber, supra note 278, at 9-11; Barber, supra note 35, at 16-21.
310 See Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace, 57 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 294,295-98 (2013).
3I) Barber, supra note 35, at 18-19.
312 See Barber, supra note 278, at 10-11 (finding clearly unimodal distribution for federal
contributors but slightly bimodal (though still centrist) distribution for state contributors).
313 See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301.
’I4 Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization
20 (Aug. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Associa
tion) (considering state legislative candidates over 1992-2010 period).
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over liberals and about $69,000 over conservatives.31'' PACs’ ideologies,
like individuals’, thus are reflected in their contributions.
Figure 4: Findings on Party and PAC Ideal Points by La Raja &
Schaffner316 and Barber317
Distribution of Party Money'
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I noted above that PACs are centrist for the most part. The main ex
ceptions to this rule are labor PACs, which are liberal in their orienta
tion,318 and single-issue PACs (focusing on abortion, taxes, the environ
ment, and the like), which cluster at the ideological fringes.’19 However,
these entities’ donations are dwarfed by those of corporate and trade
PACs, to which the rule applies in full.’20 Another caveat is that PACs’
315 See Bonica, supra note 310, at 306, 308 (considering U.S. House candidates in 2006
and 2008).
316 La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8.
317 Barber, supra note 278, at 11.
318 See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301, 306-08; Bonica, supra note 285, at 375 (finding
that “ideological model” performs better than “investor model” in explaining labor PACs’
contributions); see also McCarty et al., supra note 278, at 148, 152 (finding that labor PACs
mostly contribute to liberal candidates).
319 See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301; La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8, 14
(showing bimodal pattern for donations by issue groups); see also Michael Jay Barber, Buy
ing Representation: The Incentives, Ideology, and Influence of Campaign Contributors in
American Politics 17-19 (Sep. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University,
on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (finding that “ideological groups” includ
ing both labor PACs and single-issue PACs have bimodal ideal point distribution).
20 See Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Par
ties, Super PACs and Outside Spending Groups, Ctr. for Responsive Pol.,

1482

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:1425

centrist ideal points may be the product not of actual moderation but ra
ther of tactical giving to politicians from both parties aimed at securing
access. There is some truth to this story; PACs give more heavily to in
cumbents than to challengers,321 and the variance of the ideologies of the
candidates to whom PACs contribute is relatively high.322 But Bonica323
and McCarty et al.324 both found that this variance is not as high as it
would be if PACs actually were insensitive to candidates’ views. PACs’
motives for giving thus seem to be a mix of acquiring access and sup
porting like-minded candidates.
This typology of campaign funders’ ideologies— in which individual
donors are extreme, and parties and PACs are moderate—explains why
certain campaign finance regulations are aligning and others are misa
ligning. In brief, regulations that decrease the relative importance of in
dividual donors, or increase the relative importance of parties and PACs,
are aligning. Conversely, policies that make candidates more reliant on
individual donors, or less reliant on parties and PACs, are misaligning.
Policies’ aligning implications follow directly from their impact on the
composition of candidates’ funds.
Accordingly, as Barber found, contribution limits on individuals are
aligning. The lower a state’s individual limit is, the smaller the average
individual donation is, the more individuals hit the contribution ceiling,
and the less candidates raise from individuals.325 As a result, a state that
switches from no individual limit at all to some sort of limit can expect
candidates’ ideologies to shift toward the center by 0.1 to 0.3 units (on a
-2 to 2 scale).326 And a state that cuts its individual limit in half can ex-

http://www.opensecrets.org/ bigpicture/blio.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015)
[hereinafter Business-Labor-Ideology Split] (showing that in 2012 cycle, business PACs
provided 72% of PAC contributions, compared to 13% for labor PACs and 15% for ideolog
ical PACs).
3-4 See Barber, supra note 278, at 13-14 (showing that, relative to individual donors, PACs
give greater share of contributions to incumbents at both state and federal levels); Barber,
sujDra note 35, at 16-20 (same at state level).
22 See Barber, supra note 278, at 12-14 (showing that variance is larger for PACs than for
individual donors at both state and federal levels).
3~**3 See Bonica, supra note 310, at 302 (showing that variance for most PACs at state and
federal levels is below threshold that would indicate ideologically random giving).
3‘4 See McCarty et al., supra note 278, at 148-50 (showing that variance for most PACs at
federal level is below threshold that would indicate ideologically random giving).
3‘5 See Barber, supra note 35, at 32-33 (presenting charts displaying each of these rela
tionships).
326 See id. at 36-38. The larger of these figures is for Republican candidates.
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pect candidates’ positions to become 0.02 to 0.03 units more moder
ate.327 These effects may seem modest but they actually are quite sub
stantial. As Barber wrote about the impact of adopting individual limits
in the first place, “This change is large and is two thirds of the standard
deviation of [party] ideal points . . . ,”328
Next, as La Raja and Schaffner determined, contribution limits on
parties are misaligning. Where such limits are present, state senate can
didates receive a smaller proportion of their funds from parties, and a
larger proportion from individual donors.329 For moderate candidates in
particular, party limits cause their share of party-supplied funds to drop
from above 8% to below 4%.3j0 Consequently, party limits exert a cen
trifugal influence on candidates’ positions, and the absence of such lim
its exerts a centripetal influence. Specifically, the median Democrat’s
ideology is 1.56 units apart from the median Republican’s in state legis
latures subject to party limits, but only 1.15 units apart in legislatures
free from such limits.3jl Party limits thus are associated with roughly a
35% increase in polarization.332
Analogously, as Barber also found, contribution limits on PACs are
misaligning too. The tighter a state’s PAC limit is, the smaller the aver
age PAC donation is, the more PACs bump up against the contribution
ceiling, and the less candidates collect from PACs.333 As a result, a state
that switches from no PAC limit at all to some kind of limit can expect
candidates’ ideologies to move away from the midpoint by 0.1 to 0.2
units.334 And a state that cuts its PAC limit in half can expect candidates’
positions to become 0.005 to 0.02 units more extreme.335 These effects
“7 See id. The larger of these figures again is for Republicans.
328 Id. at 36 (referring to Republican candidates and also finding that impact is smaller for
Democrats). Moreover, these effects are quite a bit larger in states with more professional
legislatures. See id. at 37; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Elec
toral Reform, 67 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 40^12, on file with au
thor) (also finding that individual contribution limits improve district-level alignment).
329 See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 16 (showing bar charts to this effect); id. at
19 (confirming result with multiple regression model).
330 See id. at 17.
331 See Ray La Raja & Brian Schaffner, Want to Reduce Polarization? Give Parties More
Money, Wash. Post (July 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/
wp/2014/07/21 /want-to-reduce-polarization-give-parties-more-money.
332 ,
2 See id.
333 ;
1See Barber, supra note 35, at 32-34 (presenting charts displaying each of these rela
tionships).
"334'S,e e id. at 37-39.
335
’ See id.
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are sizeable as well: “[M]oving to unlimited PAC contributions
shifts . . . legislators’ predicted ideal p o in t. . . [by] 43 percent of the
standard deviation of [party] ideal points.”336
This leaves us with public financing, two types of which have been
analyzed for their aligning impact. First, Hall337 and Seth Masket and
Michael Miller338 examined the “clean money” systems used in Arizona,
Connecticut, and Maine. Under these systems, candidates who obtain a
certain number of small contributions from individual donors then re
ceive block grants that fund the rest of their campaigns.339 Publicly
funded candidates also must abide by spending limits and accept no fur
ther donations. ’40 Despite their popularity with reformers, these schemes
are misaligning because they eliminate most party and PAC contribu
tions and make the grants contingent on candidates’ appeal to individual
donors. According to Hall, the gap between a Democrat and a Republi
can representing the same district (and the same median voter) jumps
from 1.16 units to 1.51 units under clean money.341 According to Masket
and Miller, candidates entering the legislature after being elected with
clean money often (but not always) are more polarized than their pri
vately financed peers.342

336 Id. at 38. These effects are larger for Democrats in states with more professional legis
latures and for Republicans in states with less professional legislatures. See id. at 37.
See Hall, supra note 314, at 4-5 (focusing on clean money systems but also considering
older (and less generous) public financing systems used in Minnesota and Wisconsin).
338 See Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller, Buying Extremists? Public Funding, Parties,
and Polarization in Maine and Arizona 4-6 (2012) (considering Arizona and Maine).
3j<) See id. at 4—5; Hall, supra note 314, at 4-5.
340 See Masket & Miller, supra note 338, at 5.
]41 See Hall, supra note 314, at 19.
See Masket & Miller, supra note 338, at 15-19, 30. In particular, this effect holds for
Democrats and Republicans in Arizona (where the polarizing effects are larger too), and for
Republicans in Maine. See also Jeffrey J. Harden & Justin H. Kirkland, Do Campaign Do
nors Influence Polarization? Evidence from Public Financing in the American States, Legis.
Stud. Q. (forthcoming 2016), available at https://jhkirkla.wordpress.com/2015/01/27/docampaign-donors-influence-polarization-evidence-from-public-financing-in-the-americanstates-with-jeffrey-j-harden) (also finding increase in polarization following enactment of
reform in Arizona and Maine, but concluding that increase is not statistically significant);
Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller, Does Public Election Funding Create More Extreme
Legislators? Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 15 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 1, 9-12 (2014) (re
running earlier analysis and finding statistically significant polarizing effect only for Arizona
Republicans); Stephanopoulos et al„ supra note 328 (manuscript at 40^12) (also finding that
public financing is misaligning at district level).
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Second, Elizabeth Genn et al.343 and Michael Malbin et al.344 uncov
ered tantalizing clues that New York City’s multiple-match system may
be aligning (though they did not measure alignment directly). Under
New York City’s system, contributions up to $175 from individual do
nors to city council candidates are matched six-to-one by the govern
ment.345 Publicly funded candidates again must comply with spending
limits, but they are not barred from receiving contributions from parties
and PACs.346 That these more centrist entities are not excluded from par
ticipation is one reason why multiple-match may perform differently
than clean money.
The more important reason is that multiple-match transforms the pool
of individual donors. Genn et al. compared donors to city council candi
dates to donors to New York City’s state house candidates (to whom
multiple-match does not apply).347 They determined that the former are
poorer (with almost the same poverty rate as the city as a whole), more
racially diverse (with almost the same non-white proportion), and less
educated (with almost the same share not completing high school).348
Multiple-match thus attracts a much more representative group of do
nors than conventional private financing. Similarly, Malbin et al. found
that city council candidates raise 63% of their funds from donors who
give less than $2 50.349 In contrast, U.S. Senate candidates raise only
14% of their funds from such donors, U.S. House candidates raise only
8%, and New York state legislative candidates just 7%.350 This result al-

343 See Elisabeth Genn et al., Donor Diversity Through Public Matching Funds 7 (2012)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/publications/DonorDiversity Report_WEB.PDF).
44 See Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Match
ing Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 Election L.J. 3, 4 (2012).
45 See id. at 5-6.
346 See id. at 5, 7.
347 See Genn et al., supra note 343, at 8. More specifically, they compared the census block
groups (“CBGs”) where donors live, because information about the donors themselves was
unavailable.
348 See id. at 14. In particular, 21% of New Yorkers are below the poverty line, compared
to 19% of city council and 16% of state house small-donor CBGs; 55% of New Yorkers are
non-white, compared to 54% of city council and 39% of state house small-donor CBGs; and
28% of New Yorkers have not finished high school, compared to 26% of city council and
22% of state house small-donor CBGs. See id.
349 See Malbin et al., supra note 344, at 14-15 (including matching funds received from
city).
50 See id at 14. Just below New York City on the list is Minnesota, where state legislative
candidates raise sixty percent of their funds from small donors. Minnesota has the most gen-
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so suggests that donors to city council candidates, unlike most other in
dividual donors in American politics, may be a centripetal rather than a
centrifugal force.
IV. T h e I m p l ic a t io n s

of

A l ig n m e n t

A key lesson from this empirical evidence is that alignment is affect
ed in different ways by different policies. Unlike interests such as anti
corruption, anti-distortion, and equality, which tend to be asserted in de
fense of every kind of campaign finance regulation,351 alignment is an
available justification only in limited circumstances. In this Part, I ex
plore what exactly these circumstances are. I explore, that is, what the
doctrinal implications of the alignment approach are for the main types
of campaign finance regulation: contribution limits, expenditure limits,
and public financing.352 In this discussion, I draw heavily on the political
science studies detailed above. But I also rely on informed speculation
where actual empirics are unavailable.
Three more points before beginning this analysis: First, that a given
policy is misaligning, or neutral in its impact, does not mean that it is
necessarily unconstitutional. It only means that the alignment interest
cannot be used to justify the policy. Quite possibly, other interests still
can be invoked in the policy’s defense. I focus here on the doctrinal con
sequences that would follow from judicial recognition of the alignment
interest. But I do not mean to slight other interests whose consequences
may be quite different. Second, the constitutionality of a given policy
hinges on both its connection to alignment and the magnitude of the
burden it imposes on First Amendment rights. I only consider the link to
alignment here. But it is worth noting that a heavy rights burden triggers

erous of the first-generation public financing systems, offering donors a rebate of up to fifty
dollars for their campaign contributions, as well as block grants to participating candidates.
See id.
351 In particular, the anti-corruption interest has been invoked in essentially every Supreme
Court case since Buckley. See supra Section I.B.
352 1 do not discuss disclosure requirements because there is no available evidence on their
aligning effects. They also rest on sturdier legal ground than other regulations thanks to their
connection to the government’s distinct informational interest. See Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876, 914-16 (2010) (discussing this interest). I also do not discuss measures out
side the campaign finance context that might both improve alignment and burden First
Amendment rights. There is only so much ground a given paper can cover.
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more stringent judicial scrutiny,353 which in turn may lead to the voiding
of a policy that is aligning (just not aligning enough).
And third, this Part’s doctrinal conclusions are provisional in several
respects. Most obviously, they hinge on very recent empirical studies
whose findings may turn out to be incorrect. If individual donors are not
ideologically extreme, or if parties and PACs are not relatively moder
ate, then very different results would follow. Even if the studies are ac
curate at present, actors’ views may shift over time. One can imagine a
future world, not too unlike our own, in which aroused centrists are the
largest individual donors, and parties and PACs choose to prioritize ide
ology over electability.354 Lastly, laws that differentiate by entity may be
vulnerable to manipulation. For instance, if individuals were subject to
tighter limits than parties or PACs, they could channel more of their
funds through the latter groups. The laxer restrictions on the groups then
would have to be revisited to take into account their increased extrem-

A. Contribution Limits
Contribution limits are perhaps the most familiar kind of campaign fi
nance regulation. They restrict contributions to candidates by individu
als, parties, PACs, corporations, unions, and other entities.356 At the fed
eral level, individuals can donate up to $5,200 per candidate per cycle.357
353 See supra note 218 and accompanying text (noting that standard of review is stricter for
expenditure limits, which Court views as particularly burdensome, than for contribution lim
its). Assuming that alignment is a compelling interest, the main reason why the standard of
review matters is that strict scrutiny typically requires a regulation to be the least restrictive
means for achieving the interest. A plaintiff thus could try to show that there exist less bur
densome but equally aligning measures that could be enacted. However, this showing would
not be easy. The evidence on the aligning effects of most electoral regulations is either
mixed or nonexistent, and many of these regulations burden constitutional rights as well.
354 Though it is worth noting that the relative ideological positions of individuals, parties,
and PACs have not varied greatly in the past, see Barber, supra note 35, at 14-16, and that
there are good theoretical reasons to expect each entity to continue to hold the views that it
does today.
355 Though it is unclear that parties or PACs would change their giving patterns if they re
ceived more money from ideologically extreme individuals. The groups’ incentives to con
tribute to more moderate candidates would remain in place.
356 They also restrict contributions to some of the entities that themselves are restricted in
how much they may give to candidates.
357 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)-(2) (2012); Contribution Limits 2013-14, Fed. Election
Comm’n, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml (last visited June 26,
2015).
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The equivalent figure is $10,000 both for parties and for PACs, while
direct corporate and union contributions are banned.358 The aggregate
limit of $123,200 on individual donations per cycle recently was struck
down in McCutcheon:'y> At the state level, contribution limits vary dra
matically from one jurisdiction (and funding source) to another.360 Indi
vidual limits, for instance, range from $320 in Montana to no cap at all
in a dozen states.’61 Similarly, corporate and union limits run the gamut
from outright prohibition to no restriction whatsoever.362
Beginning with individual contribution limits, they generally would
be valid under the alignment approach for the simple reason that they
generally are aligning. The empirical evidence shows that individual do
nors hold ideologically extreme views and that politicians mirror these
views almost perfectly.’6’ Barber also found that restrictions on individ
ual contributions cause politicians’ positions to move toward the center
(though further confirmation of this finding would be helpful).364 To be
sure, one can conceive of scenarios in which individual limits would not
be aligning—if individual donors in a given jurisdiction were ideologi
cally moderate, if they gave for reasons other than candidates’ ideologi
cal proximity to them, or if candidates were not motivated to maximize
their campaign resources. But there is no indication that these scenarios
are common in modem American politics. The connection between in
dividual limits and alignment thus is strong.
Next, contribution limits on parties typically could not be sustained
under the alignment approach. La Raja and Schaffner determined that
parties give more heavily to moderate candidates than to extreme
ones.365 They also found that restrictions on party contributions are
linked to about a 35% increase in legislative polarization (though further
confirmation again would be useful).366 True, the motivation for the par
ties’ giving may be strategic rather than ideological. The parties may
35S See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3); Contribution Limits 2013-14, supra note 357.
359 See Contribution Limits 2013-14, supra note 357; see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134
S. Ct. 1434, 1442—43 (2014) (plurality opinion).
360 See Contribution Limits: An Overview, Nat’l Conf. of State Legis. (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contribution-limitsoverview.
361 See id.
362 See id.
363 See supra Section I1I.B.
364 See Barber, supra note 35, at 37-39.
365 See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8, 14.
366 See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 331.
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want to win more elections by supporting more moderate candidates, not
to see more moderate policy actually enacted.367 But the parties’ intent is
irrelevant for present purposes. It is the effect that counts here, and the
impact of party limits is plainly misaligning.
The story is somewhat more complicated for contribution limits on
PACs. According to Bonica, corporate and trade PACs usually have
moderate ideal points .368 According to Barber, restrictions on PAC con
tributions (most of which are made by corporate and trade groups) cause
politicians’ positions to shift away from the center. ’69 So far, so good;
contribution limits on corporate and trade PACs, like such limits on par
ties, are not aligning and so could not be upheld under the alignment ap
proach. But there are other types of PACs too, and their ideal points are
not moderate. In particular, Bonica determined that labor PACs are quite
liberal, and that single-issue PACs are highly bimodal in their stances.370
Contribution limits on these PACs might well be aligning, as they could
reduce politicians’ incentive to veer left in the case of labor PACs, or
toward either extreme in the case of single-issue PACs. ’71 The doctrinal
fate of PAC limits thus might vary by PAC category.
This conclusion may be unsettling to some readers. Are PACs not a
threat to the integrity of the electoral system, rather than a largely be
nign presence? And of the various types of PACs, are corporate and
trade PACs not the most dangerous—the very epitome of big money?
There are several responses to this unease. First, some corporate and
trade PACs do have extreme ideal points and donate more money to ex
treme candidates.372 PACs in the construction and energy sectors, for in-

367 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
368 See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301; Bonica, supra note 285, at 375.
369 See Barber, supra note 309, at 37-39.
370 See Bonica, supra note 310, at 301, 306, 308; Bonica, supra note 285, at 375; see also
McCarty et al., supra note 278, at 148 (finding that labor PACs have more liberal contribu
tion patterns than other PACs); La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 283, at 8, 14 (finding that
issue groups donate to more ideologically extreme candidates).
371 Alas, this prediction has not yet been tested by political scientists. Another hypothesis
that has yet to be investigated is that contribution limits on corporations and unions have the
same aligning implications, respectively, as limits on corporate and union PACs. This hy
pothesis seems reasonable because corporate PACs raise almost all of their money from cor
porate employees, and union PACs obtain almost all of their funds from union members.
372 See Bonica, supra note 310, at 306 (showing that PACs in certain sectors give more
money to extreme Democrats and/or Republicans relative to baseline candidate). In addition,
PACs’ overall moderation may mask particular positions (quite possibly on the issues that
matter most to the PACs) that are very different from those of the general public.
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stance, are skewed distinctly to the right.373 If their contributions were
limited, the effect likely would be aligning. Second, corporate and trade
PACs may undermine the electoral system through mechanisms other
than misalignment. Their donations may buy them special access to
lawmakers and special influence over the shaping of public policy.
These are troublesome results even if they do not produce measurable
non-congruence. And third, it is possible that the democratic threat
posed by business influence has been overstated. Corporate and trade
PACs are nobody’s idea of altruistic groups sacrificing for the public
good. But their relative moderation in a time of surging polarization may
be valuable.
Another potentially worrisome implication of this analysis is that the
validity of contribution limits may vary based on the identity of the enti
ty being limited. Restrictions on individual contributions may be lawful,
for example, while restrictions on party or PAC contributions may not
be. Does this not amount to illegal viewpoint discrimination? Again,
there are several replies to this objection. First, the essence of viewpoint
discrimination is action taken by a jurisdiction because it “fears, dislikes,
or disagrees with” the “substantive content” of a given message.374 But if
a jurisdiction limits certain entities’ donations in order to promote
alignment, then the rationale for the limitation is the promotion of
alignment—not any fear, dislike, or disagreement with the entities’
views. It also is not the entities’ views that concern a jurisdiction seeking
to improve alignment, but rather the views’ divergence from the position
of the median voter. Location along an ideological spectrum is distinct
from the substantive content that the government is prohibited from tak
ing into account.
Second, it is unlikely that courts would consider contribution limits to
be vulnerable to a viewpoint discrimination challenge in the first place.
Any particular restriction treats identically all donors whom it covers. A
contribution limit on individuals, for instance, in no way distinguishes
between moderate and extreme persons. At the aggregate level too, con-

Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014). Or as now-Justice Elena Kagan has put
it, “[whenever hostility toward ideas as such. . . has played some part in effecting a re
striction on speech, the restriction is irretrievably tainted.” Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 413, 431 (1996) (emphasis added). “In contrast. . . when the government has re
stricted ideas only as and when they bear harmful consequences[,] the government’s purpos
es support sustaining the action.” Id. (emphasis added).
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sidering the full set of limits in effect in a given jurisdiction, the policies
may differentiate by entity, but they do not do so by viewpoint. And un
der the Court’s precedent, speaker-based regulations are subject only to
review for reasonableness, in contrast to the strict scrutiny that applies to
viewpoint-based regulations.375
Lastly, while the contribution limits that best promote alignment may
vary by entity, existing limits do so too. At the federal level, as noted
earlier, the donation ceiling is $5,200 for individuals, $10,000 for parties
and PACs, and $0 for corporations and unions.376 Most states also speci
fy different limits for different entities.377 The reasons for this divergent
treatment have not been disclosed, but they presumably include judg
ments about the relative threat posed by different funding sources. Ac
cordingly, if the optimal pro-alignment policy set may be challenged on
viewpoint discrimination grounds, then so too may be the status quo.
Both the alignment approach and the status quo distinguish among enti
ties based on their capacity to undermine key democratic values. But if
the status quo is secure from such attack—as suggested by the lack of
any campaign finance regulation struck down for discriminating by
viewpoint—then the alignment approach should be safe as w ell/78
B. Expenditure Limits
Limits on electoral expenditures are a second kind of campaign fi
nance regulation, albeit one more important in theory than in practice.
Congress’s 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act in
cluded spending limits on individuals, groups, candidates, and parties.379
But all of these limits were struck down in Buckley on the grounds that
375 See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 Va. L. Rev. 231,267 (2012)
(observing that “speaker- and medium-based discrimination appears not to be suspect in it
self’); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 189, 247 (1983) (noting that “the Court sharply distinguished] speaker-based from
viewpoint-based restrictions and . . . test[s] speaker-based restrictions by a standard of rea
sonableness”).
376 See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
377 See supra notes 360-62 and accompanying text.
378 A related First Amendment concern may be that the alignment approach seems, at first
glance, to permit the silencing of dissenters seeking to persuade the public of their unortho
dox views. In fact, the approach does no such thing. Either dissenting speech fails to per
suade, in which case it is irrelevant, or it does persuade, in which case people’s preferences
shift and there is a new benchmark with which governmental outputs should align. Speech
never can be regulated under this approach because of its impact on the public.
379 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976).
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they burdened First Amendment rights more heavily than contribution
limits, while not preventing corruption as effectively.380 Spending bans
on corporations and unions survived Buckley and also were upheld in
Austin,381 But they too fell by the wayside in Citizens United™2 At pre
sent, no form of expenditure limit, at either the state or federal level, is
permitted.383
Because few spending limits have been in place since Buckley, there
is little direct evidence on their aligning implications. Political scientists
cannot easily assess policies that have not been enacted. But it still is
possible to make some educated guesses as to how different types of
spending limits would fare under the alignment approach, using the data
that is available. One reasonable hypothesis is that campaign funders
exhibit the same ideological inclinations whether they use their funds on
contributions or expenditures. In other words, individuals, unions, and
single-issue groups are ideologically extreme (and prefer extreme candi
dates) whether they are donating money or spending it themselves.
Likewise, parties and businesses are relatively moderate (and prefer
moderate candidates) no matter how they are deploying their resources.
Some support for this hypothesis comes from the identities of the in
dividuals who gave money to Super PACs in the 2012 election. (Super
PACs, again, may fundraise and spend in unlimited quantities because
they do not contribute directly to candidates.384) According to the Center
for Responsive Politics, more than 80% of the individuals who donated
to Restore Our Future, the Super PAC supporting Mitt Romney’s candi
dacy, also gave the maximum possible amount to Romney’s own cam
paign.’8'' The proportions were similar for other presidential candi-

380 See id. at 39, 44-59.
381 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660-61 (1990).
383 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901-908, 911-913 (2010).
’ Prior to Citizens United, bans on corporate and union expenditures existed in about half of
the states. See Life After Citizens United, Nat’l Conference of State Legis. (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx; see also Am.
Tradition P ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (summarily revers
ing Montana Supreme Court decision upholding corporate expenditure ban, and thus confirmin |gthat “the holding of Citizens United applies to . . . state law”).
See supra notes 4, 109 and accompanying text. Super PACs have become the vehicle of
choice for funders who would like to make independent expenditures. Relatively few funders
choose to make such expenditures themselves. Of course, as with conventional PACs, it is
possible that Super PACs’ spending priorities may diverge from those of their funders.
See Double-Duty Donors, Part II: Large Numbers of Wealthy Donors Hit Legal Limit on
Giving to Candidates, Turn to Presidential Super PACs in Continuing Trend, Ctr. for Respon-
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dates.386 Donors to Super PACs and donors to actual campaigns thus
were the very same people. Analogously, McCarty et al. found that in
the 2002 election—the last before the use of soft money to pay for par
ties’ unlimited issue advertising was banned—almost all large soft mon
ey donors held extreme views.387 The same pattern held in 2004 when
funds flowed to other groups that also could engage in unlimited issue
advertising. “The major contributors to . . . [these groups were] exactly
the same people who made large soft money contributions.”388
Data from the 2012 election further suggests that corporations are rel
atively moderate and unions are liberal in their spending choices. Free
for the first time to tap their treasuries in federal elections, corporations
allocated just $75 million to independent expenditures/89 This sum
amounted to about 1% of total federal outlays,390 and contrasts sharply
with the $365 million that corporate PACs gave to candidates.391 Such
limited spending is what one would expect if corporations are mostly
centrist entities seeking to ruffle few feathers and maintain their access
to officeholders. Unions, on the other hand, took full advantage of their
newfound flexibility in 2012. They devoted $105 million to independent
expenditures,392 compared to $66 million in labor PAC contributions to
candidates.393 Such aggressive exploitation of new funding opportunities
is what one would expect from highly ideological actors. ’94
sive Pol. (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/02/double-duty-donors-partii-large-nu.html. Unfortunately, this study only covered donations to candidate-linked Super
PACs in 2011. More research is needed on donors to the entire array of Super PACs over the
whole election cycle.
386 See id.
387 See McCarty et al., supra note 278, at 155-58, 162.
388 See id. at 158. These groups were organized under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
and included America Comes Together, a sort of shadow campaign for Democratic nominee
John Kerry.
389 See Bonica, supra note 3, at 10. Technically, corporations and unions also were able to
make independent expenditures in part of the 2010 cycle, since Citizens United was decided
in January 2010. See also Diana Dwyre, After Citizens United and SpeechNow.org: Consid
ering the Consequences of New Campaign Finance Rules 13 (Sept. 3, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1901547) (finding that corporations gave
just $0.05 million to Super PACs in 2010, and unions $10.9 million).
390 See FEC 2012 Summary, supra note 2 (noting total federal spending of $7.3 billion in
2012).

391 See Business-Labor-Ideology Split, supra note 320.
392 See Bonica, supra note 3, at 12.
393 See Business-Labor-Ideology Split, supra note 320.
394 O f course, this data is merely suggestive of corporations’ and unions’ ideological incli
nations. Corporations could be extreme despite devoting only a small share of their funds to
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That campaign funders have the same policy preferences no matter
how they use their money, however, does not prove that expenditures
are linked to alignment itself. For this conclusion to follow, expenditures
also must exert an influence on candidates. On this point, a reasonable
hypothesis is that expenditures indeed affect candidates—but not quite
to the same extent as contributions. Candidates tend to hold the same
positions as their donors, either because they shift their views in the do
nors direction to attract funding, or because only candidates who share
the donors’ views in the first place are financially viable.395 These mech
anisms also seem likely to produce convergence between candidates and
those who spend on their behalf, only not to the same degree because a
donated dollar is more valuable to a candidate than an independently
spent dollar. The candidate has full control over the donated dollar,
while the spent dollar may not be used precisely as the candidate would
have liked.
Unfortunately, I am unaware of any empirical evidence on the impact
of expenditures on candidates. The Court, though, seems convinced that
candidates are not indifferent to money that is spent on their behalf. In
McCutcheon, the Court gave an example of a candidate faced with a
choice between $26,000 in contributions and $500,000 in supportive ex
penditures.396 The Court was confident the candidate would prefer the
latter.397 The candidate’s lack of control over the spending may “‘un
dermine!;] the value of the expenditure’”—“[b]ut probably not by 95
percent.”398 Many scholars concur with the Court. Briffault, for instance,
has argued that the “prospect o f . . . extremely large—and legally unlim
ited-donations to an allied Super PAC . . . is at least as likely to affect
the . . . decisions of elected officials as the relatively paltry amounts that
candidates’ personal campaign committees are allowed to receive.”399

independent spending, and unions could be moderate despite devoting a large share. This is
an area where further research plainly would be valuable.
395 See supra Section III.B.
6 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1454 (2014) (plurality opinion).
397 See id.
398 Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010)); see also FEC v. Natl’l
Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (noting that “absence of prear
rangement and coordination” of expenditure “undermines” but does not eliminate “the value
of the expenditure to the candidate”).
399 Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1644, 1692 (2012).
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Likewise, Cain has commented that a candidate will not “feel any less
obligated to a large independent spender than to a large contributor.” 4"0
If spenders and donors are equally ideological, and if spending and
donating have similar effects on candidates, then spending and donating
limits would have the same legal status under the alignment approach.
They would rise or fall together for each category of campaign funder.401
Accordingly, spending limits on individuals, unions, and single-issue
groups (all ideologically extreme funding sources) generally would be
valid because they generally would be aligning.402 On the other hand,
spending limits on parties and businesses (both relatively moderate
sources) typically could not be sustained by reference to alignment.403
The doctrinal distinction between contributions and expenditures, a cor
nerstone of campaign finance law since Buckley, thus would crumble
under the alignment approach. Money would be treated the same wheth
er it is donated or spent.
C. Public Financing
Public financing is the final major category of campaign finance regu
lation, and it can be divided in turn into three types of policies. First,
several states provide block grants to participating candidates who re-

400 Cain, supra note 175, at 43; see also, e.g., Cole, supra note 193, at 272 (arguing that
“expenditures are just as corrupting as contributions”); Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Pro
gressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 21, 33 (2014) (observing that “$20 million in a Super PAC supporting Member of Con
gress X is less bad (but still bad) than $20 million in Member X’s campaign account”); Mi
chael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1902, 1914 (2013) (not
ing that Super PACs “embody a dramatic increase in the . . . influence of the very wealthy in
national politics”).
401 As for spending limits on candidates, they could not be upheld on the basis of align
ment. Candidates’ own spending cannot induce them to move in any particular ideological
direction. Furthermore, the earlier discussion of viewpoint discrimination challenges, see
supra notes 374-77 and accompanying text, applies here as well. Spending limits that distin
guish between different entities might be subject to such attacks, but for the reasons stated
earlier, 1 do not believe that the attacks would succeed.
402 This conclusion also likely would hold for PACs, Super PACs, or other groups funded
by these actors. And unlike under Lessig’s model, there would be no reason to distinguish
between individual expenditures (whose restriction Lessig would bar) and individual contri
butions to Super PACs (which Lessig would allow to be curtailed). See Lessig, supra note
170, at 20-21. If funds from individual donors are misaligning, they could be regulated un
der the alignment approach no matter what form they take.
403 Again, this conclusion likely would hold for PACs, Super PACs, or other groups fund
ed by these entities.
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ceive a sufficient number of small individual donations.404 In some cas
es, these grants are relatively stingy, and candidates may continue fund
raising until they hit the spending limits that accompany the public
funds.405 But in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine (the clean money
states), the grants are meant to pay for campaigns in full, and candidates
may collect no further contributions after accepting them.406
Second, numerous jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local levels
encourage individual donations through matching programs and tax ben
efits. The federal government matches contributions up to $250 to quali
fying candidates in presidential primary elections.407 About half a dozen
states offer tax credits or deductions for donations, typically up to $50 or
$100.4IIS And cities such as Los Angeles and Oakland have one-to-one
matches similar to the federal government’s,409 while New York City
employs a suc-to-one match for contributions up to $175.410 Third, an
other ten or so states provide block grants to political parties.411 These
(quite modest) grants usually are paid for by income tax check-offs
ranging from $1 to $5 that enable taxpayers to steer funds to the party of
their choice.412
O f these policies, the doctrinal fate of block grants triggered by indi
vidual donations is clearest. These measures generally could not be up
held under the alignment approach because they generally are misalign
ing. Hall found that candidates’ positions diverge from the ideological
center after clean money systems (or their less generous predecessors)
are adopted.41’ Likewise, Masket and Miller determined that candidates
0 See Michael G. Miller, After the GAO Report: What Do We Know About Public Election
Funding?, 10 Election L.J. 273, 274-75 (2011); Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview,
Nat’1 Conference of State Legis. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx [hereinafter Public Financing Over
view].
405 See Public Financing Overview, supra note 404.
4116 See id. A few more states employ clean money systems for statewide (as opposed to
legislative) elections. See id.
4117 See Public Funding of Presidential Election, Fed. Election Comm’n (Apr. 2014),
httg7/www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml.
8 See Public Financing Overview, supra note 404.
404 See Steven M. Levin, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in American Elections 1 lb 17 (2006); see also Public Financing Overview, supra note 404 (showing that several states
also offer matching funds to candidates for statewide office).
4111 See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
411 See Public Financing Overview, supra note 404.
412 See id.
413 See Hall, supra note 314, at 19.
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elected with clean money often are more polarized than their peers who
rely on private financing.414 Both studies attributed their findings to can
didates’ need to appeal to ideologically extreme individual donors in or
der to qualify for public funds.
To be sure, there may be compelling rationales for these regulations
other than alignment. For example, the very terminology of “clean”
money suggests that it is less corrupting than the usual “dirty” cash.4”
Political scientists also have observed striking increases in competitive
ness in the clean money states.416 Moreover, it may be possible to revise
the regulations in ways that make them more aligning. For instance, if
block grants were offered automatically to candidates (as they are in
presidential general elections417), then candidates would not have to woo
polarized individual donors. Alternatively, if candidates had to collect
contributions from voters from both parties (and from independents too)
before qualifying for grants, then their donor bases would be less
skewed toward the ideological fringes. Reformers who value alignment
should consider such tweaks.
Next, most of the programs aimed at spurring individual donations al
so could not be sustained under the alignment approach. The problem
here, though, is not that these programs are misaligning, but rather that
they seem to have little impact on the composition of the donor pool.
According to a series of surveys, donors in presidential elections (in
which contribution matching is available) are just as unrepresentative of
the general population as donors in congressional elections (in which it
is not).418 Similarly, at the state level, candidates raise a median of 15%
of their funds from small donors in states offering tax credits or deduc-

414 See Masket & Miller, supra note 338, at 15-17. And if Harden and Kirkland are correct
that clean money systems have no impact on polarization, then they still are not aligning and
so cannot be sustained under the alignment approach. See Harden & Kirkland, supra note
342 (manuscript at 23-24).
415 Cf. Fair Facts, Pub. Campaign, http://www.publicampaign.org/fair-facts (last visited
Aug. 1, 2014) (claiming that clean money will end solicitation of “well heeled donors and
lobbyists” as well as government “bought and paid for by special interests”).
41®See, e.g., Hall, supra note 314 (manuscript at 12—15); Neil Malhotra, The Impact of
Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 8 St. Pol. &
Pol’y Q. 263, 273-77 (2008); Miller, supra note 404, at 283-84.
417 See Public Funding of Presidential Election, supra note 407.
418 Compare Wilcox et al., supra note 268, at 66-67 (analyzing presidential donors), and
IPDI Study, supra note 269, at 12 (also analyzing presidential donors), with Francia et ah,
supra note 5, at 27-28 (analyzing congressional donors).
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tions.414 The equivalent figure in states that do not offer such incentives
is a nearly identical 17%.420 Since these programs do not meaningfully
alter the donor pool, it is hard to see how they could affect the level of
alignment.
The main exception to this pessimistic conclusion is New York City’s
multiple-match system. Malbin et al. determined that city council candi
dates collect 63% of their funds from small donors, the highest such fig
ure in the nation.4"1 Likewise, Genn et al. concluded that donors to city
council candidates are very similar to the city’s general population in
terms of race, income, and education.422 If these donors also are ideolog
ically representative (a proposition that has yet to be tested), then they
would exert an aligning influence on the candidates who seek their sup
port. In this case, New York City’s system, unlike most efforts to stimu
late contributions, would be valid under the alignment approach.
So too (most likely) would be voucher schemes of the sort proposed
by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres,423 Hasen,424 and Lessig.425 All of
these schemes would grant to each voter a voucher of a set dollar
amount, which the voter then could disburse to candidates as she saw fit.
If almost all voters took advantage of their vouchers, then the donor
population would closely resemble the general population, and the
vouchers would create powerful aligning incentives for candidates.426
Even if voucher use was more uneven, it is doubtful that the donor popu
lation would be more unrepresentative than it is today, meaning that the
vouchers still would be aligning relative to the status quo.
Finally, though they have not yet been studied by scholars, the exist
ing block grants to the parties seem too small to have much of an effect

41’ See Malbin et al., supra note 344, at 14 (including data for five of these states: Arkan
sas, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon (of which Arkansas is median)). As noted ear
lier, Minnesota’s rebate program seems unusually effective at promoting small donor partic
ipation. See supra note 350.
420 See Malbin et al., supra note 419, at 14 (showing that Maryland is median such state).
421 See id.
422 See Genn et al., supra note 343, at 14.
4-3 See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Cam
paign Finance 186-222 (2002).
See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy? An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996).
423 See Lessig, supra note 171, at 66.
426 For the reasons discussed earlier, even perfect participation in the voucher system
would not guarantee alignment. See supra Part II (explaining why alignment is distinct from
equality of voter influence).
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on alignment. These grants often are used to cover some of the costs of
state party conventions.427 They rarely are redistributed to the parties’
actual candidates in substantial sums.428 However, Lowenstein’s pro
posal that much larger amounts of public money be provided to the par
ties, which then could channel the funds to the candidates of their
choice,429 likely would pass muster under the alignment approach. Since
the parties’ first priority is winning elections, and since moderate candi
dates are more likely to prevail than extreme ones, the parties probably
would allocate most of their resources to relatively centrist contestants.
This is how the parties deploy their funds today,430 and there is no obvi
ous reason why their tactics would change if their coffers swelled with
public money.
C o n c l u s io n

Campaign finance law is in crisis. In a series of unfortunate decisions,
the Supreme Court has rejected state interests such as anti-distortion and
equality, while narrowing the anti-corruption interest to its quid pro quo
core. This core cannot sustain the bulk of campaign finance regulation.
As a result, expenditure limits, aggregate contribution limits, and certain
public financing programs all have been struck down by the Court. If
any meaningful rules are to survive, a new interest capable of justifying
them must be found.
Alignment is just such an interest. The congruence of voters’ prefer
ences with key governmental outputs is a compelling objective because
it accords with core democratic values. Indeed, the Court has said as
much on several occasions. Alignment also is a goal that neither is for
bidden by general First Amendment principles nor is duplicative of the
interests the Court already has rebuffed. And if it were to be recognized
by the Court, it would result in much (though not all) campaign finance
427 See Levin, supra note 409, at 27; Public Financing Overview, supra note 404.
428 See Levin, supra note 409, at 27.
429 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is
Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 301, 351-52 (1989) (recommending that national parties
be provided with enough funds to support fifty strong challengers nationwide); cf. Peter J.
Wallison & Joel M. Gora, Better Parties, Better Government: A Realistic Program for Cam
paign Finance Reform 88, 92-111 (2009) (also arguing for larger role for parties in funding
of campaigns). In foreign democracies, it is common for parties to receive large sums of
public funding. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett and the Prob
lem of Campaign Finance, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 39,46.
430 See supra notes 306-08, 329-32 and accompanying text.
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regulation being upheld. Specifically, policies that curb the influence of
polarized individual funders would be valid. But measures that burden
ideologically moderate funders, such as parties and PACs, could not be
sustained on this basis.
What are the odds that the current Court would adopt the alignment
approach? They are extremely low. The Court’s hostility to campaign
finance regulation is driven above all by its libertarian theory of the First
Amendment, not by its inability to identify suitable interests. But it still
is worthwhile to make the case for alignment. For one thing, the Court
may realize that some regulation serves an end whose significance it has
acknowledged in cases such as McCutcheon. For another, a.future Court
may not be as uninterested in new rationales for reform as this one. The
alignment approach offers a receptive majority a roadmap for upholding
policies without reversing the Court’s existing precedents. Finally,
alignment deserves recognition because it is a concept that undeniably is
intertwined with money in politics. In campaign finance law, as in all
law, it is important to be clear about the values that are threatened by un
regulated activity and furthered by regulation. And of these values, few
are as vital as alignment.
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